In this chapter on mercy, I disagreed with some points and loved others. Comte-Sponville presents many differing opinions in this chapter, and I’m posing a bunch of questions here that bothered or struck me in some way.
C-S says that mercy is forgiveness of hate. That mercy must come after hate, real hate. Can I not be utterly disgusted, can you not utterly reject and renounce another’s actions, and still love them?
And he assumes, with his entire definition of mercy, that you cannot love and hate someone at the same time. Can a wife not have unconditional love for her unfaithful husband but still hate him when she finds out? This is, perhaps, a question of semantics, if you just define hate as the absence of love. What do you think?
Is evil merely an error? Meaning that the evil do not truly choose evil—they are simply misinformed or unable to understand what is evil? Can we ever know for sure either way?
“Knowledge makes forgiveness both inescapable but superfluous.” Is this really true? Say you do know every last detail of that Nazi C-S loves to talk about so much’s life. You know everything. Can’t you still imagine that you would need to forgive him? Or no, do you think if you know every last detail, you can empathize with his choices and what in his life lead him to that point? Forgiveness would become superfluous?
Do you agree with Jankelevitch—what he says on pg. 128, that “After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive?” “Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but no the SS?” (128)—I love that line and I agree with C-S whole-heartedly, but I can see where Jankelevitch is coming from. Which viewpoint do you understand
“can we and should we forgive those who have never asked forgiveness?” (129)
“loving one’s enemies… means fighting them joyously,” (130)—to what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
I truly enjoyed Comte-Sponville’s chapter on mercy, and I must admit that it brought about a sort of revelation for me. Unfortunately, it is easy to experience hate toward another human being. In many cases, in fact, we might feel that this hatred is justified—perhaps even that we are superior for feeling it. Consider, for example, rapists. The vast majority of people would probably agree that they hate rapists, and that it makes sense to feel that way. Because committing rape is totally wrong and implausible, we condemn rapists for their actions and hate them for making the choices that they do, especially if they affect us personally. While hatred might be a normal response to the atrocities committed by others, reading C-S’s account of mercy made me realize that, by feeling hateful, we are merely punishing ourselves. On page 125, he states that, “Mercy leaves hatred to the hateful, wickedness to the wicked, resentment to the resentful.” I particularly enjoy this definition. To apply mercy is to free ourselves from the hatred that we subconsciously let eat away at our own happiness.
Because mercy is such a positive and admirable quality, it is truly interesting to me that it can only exist in the absence of love and the presence of evil. C-S makes some points in regard to this concept that I especially enjoy. If the essence of mercy is the ability to forgive and to let go of hatred, it is thus impossible to display mercy toward those whom we love. C-S states that, “We are inept at love, and utterly so when it comes to the wicked. This is precisely why we need to be merciful!” (page 121) What makes us unable to love the wicked is completely contrary to the beliefs of Socrates; wickedness is brought about by evil, and evil is knowingly committed (page 123).
The one realm I feel that C-S could perhaps explain a bit more is that of punishment. Should mercy abound in the justice system? Take, for example, the example of a child abuser (page 125). When we learn that the abuser was himself abused as a child, we might be more apt to understand his situation and forgive him. Should our justice system work the same way? If it did, what would become of punishment? Later in the chapter, C-S quotes Jankélévitch: “Before forgiveness can even be considered, the offender must cease challenging his guilt and acknowledge it, making no pleas in his own defense or calling on extenuating circumstances…” Should we take this to mean that we should have mercy on criminals who accept their guilt and repent? And, if this is the case, how should they be punished? This is the only inconsistency I find within this chapter.
Mercy "elimates not the wrong but the resentment, not the memory but the anger…" (130). Just as the compassionate person recognizes the sufferer as his or her equal, the merciful person simiarly sees those who commit wrong as an equal as well. That is why Sponville states that mercy "lays the foundation for love…" (130). Through mercy does it become possible for one to truly love another, for in order to truly, they must be on equal terms with one another.
While mercy grants equality, it is not love. Indeed, Sponville says mercy replaces love "...when love would be premature" (130). For example, Spinoza forgave the people who tried to stab him. If he met those same people again, he would not wish to do harm against them or take revenge, for mercy erased those feelings for revenge. However, his killers would have to earn his trust back, just like every other man, but at least his mercy allows them to be seen as men at all. It allows them to start from square 1 rather than be disqualified.
By saying that mercy "elimates…hatred" and saying that mercy allows for the possibility love, Sponville seems to be setting love and hate as polar opposites that cannot coexist. Is this true? JJ's discussion of the husband and wife raises such an argument. In JJ's case, the wife had "unconditional love" for her husband; therefore, that love is contractual rather than emotional. Sponville deals with a similar scenario, in which he concludes that a parent will always have a loving bond for his or her child. In essence, the wife's "unconditional love" is waiting behind the fleeting, emotionally-driven hatred to come back out in its emotional form after the feelings of anger wash over.
If the hatred is long-lasting, can there be love? That depends. If the wife's hatred blinds her to her husband, then love cannot be there. He does not have a chance to prove he is a better man than his unfaithfulness shows because no matter what he does, she will refuse to accept it.
However, if through mercy the wife does not become blind to her husband, then it is possible for the husband and wife to regain their former love or be even more loving. Through mercy, the wife has hatred for the quality of recklessness or feebleness in her husband, but she does not hate her whole husband. She forgives his actions and gives him the opportunity to earn her affectionate, emotional love back by proving his qualities can change. "Unconditional" love, the fact that they are husband and wife, may help push her towards offering mercy.
Therefore, "unconditional" love continues to exist if hatred is only partial, and affectionate love may return eventually through mercy. However, if hate takes over a person, then affectionate love has no chance and "unconditional" love is lost in the fray. The hope for "unconditional" love is that as their marital bonds keep them together, mercy may enter at some point in time. Unfortunately, many couples divorce or simply leave each other before this extended stage begins.
As JJ prompted, "C-S says that mercy is forgiveness of hate. That mercy must come after hate, real hate." After reading this statement by C-S, I was greatly troubled. I most commonly relate the word "mercy" to my relationship with Christ and His forgiveness of my sins (which matches C-S's original definition of mercy as "the virtue of forgiveness" (118)). C-S suggests that in order for mercy to occur, hate must first be present. I feel that he has taken this definition to an extreme that is most definitely not always true.
Did I ever hate Christ? Did Christ ever hate me? But, yet, he still shows me mercy every day. Sometimes we may act as if we hate someone by treating them in a hateful way, denying their authority, or treating them with utter disrespect, however, the true feeling of hate must not always be present. We can commit a wrong against someone and not hate them at all, but love them all the while. I do not always treat others that I love as I should, but that doesn't mean that I hate them, nor do they hate me.
I feel that C-S's definition of mercy should be softened. We can definitely show mercy to those that we hate or to those who have hated us, but we can also show mercy to a person we love who has hurt our feelings by a harsh comment spoken out of anger, not hatred. I do not believe that hatred is a prerequisite to mercy at all, bur rather a simple "wrongdoing" that needs forgiven. Anyone agree?
“Compassion, as we saw earlier, is concerned with suffering and most suffering is innocent. Mercy, on the other hand, is concerned with wrongdoing, which is often painless, at least for those who wrong” (119) I would argue that mercy is one of the most difficult virtues for one to possess. It requires one to let go the wrong that another has committed against you and not retaliate. I found this chapter in C-S to be my favorite thus far. Mercy is an incredibly interesting virtue, and one of the most unattainable virtues. We all know how difficult it is to truly let go of the hatred we hold for someone when we have justifiable reasons to hate them. While this is one of my favorite virtues and chapters that we have read, I was somewhat confused about the stance taken by C-S in regard to the relation of mercy and forgiveness. C-S seems to treat mercy and forgiveness somewhat like synonyms. But does mercy really require forgiveness? It is certainly possible to show mercy to someone without forgiving them. You can hold on to your hatred of a person and not retaliate against them, but is this mercy? and is mercy that continues to hold on to hatred and resentment still virtuous? In my opinion, it is really forgiveness that is the virtue, not mercy and while C-S will disagree with me, I do not believe the two are one in the same. C-S states “to forgive does not mean to erase – or to forget…It means that one has ceased to hate , which is the definition of mercy: the virtue that triumphs over rancor, over justified hatred (in this respect mercy goes beyond justice), over resentment, over the desire for revenge or punishment; the virtue that forgives, not by expunging the wrong – an impossible charge, in any case – but stilling the grudge we bear against the person who offended or harmed us” (119). I disagree with this comparison of mercy and forgiveness. There have been many families of murder victims that have argued for their loved one’s killers to be spared from the death penalty, not because they have forgiven the killer, but because they do not believe in taking someone’s life regardless of the crime. They still hate the murderer, they do not forgive him or her but there is no doubt that they are showing mercy.
In response to Karlie, I'd have to agree with the fact that the definition needs softening. On the note of hate towards/received from Christ (or another god for the other religions), I feel as if this "rule" C-S has stated probably is moot, considering that they are the divine, transcending normal human limits. Just a little conjecture there.
Mercy is a factor in the justice system for a reason. That's the reason why we have judges, jury, trials, etc. If one were to take the human element (and therefore the possibility mercy, as well as compassion) and a "formla" were made to somehow equate what each crime should equal in punishments, the system woud be less effective.
“can we and should we forgive those who have never asked forgiveness?” (129)- jj quoting C-S. I'm going to go out on a limb here and say, yes. To quote a wise man, "No, not seven times," Jesus replied, "but seventy times seven!" when asked how many times one should forgive another. And essentially, that 70x7 was intended to be such a big number as to imply that you should always forgive one another. Besides which, forgiveness is a healthy thing to do, for the individual and the society without taking away negative consequences for the wrongdoer persay.
"Is evil merely an error? Meaning that the evil do not truly choose evil—they are simply misinformed or unable to understand what is evil? Can we ever know for sure either way?" - JJ. I love this question. It was and still is one of my favorite questions to shoot back at people in, say, a religion class on morals. Though I tend to pose the question in a "What if it wasn't evil for them in their position to do so" (whici I then usually promptly receive the answer that there are things intrinsicly evil, like rape, which if you think about this answer, it isn't a sufficient response, given that it only covers one action)? I think that evil truly can be both accidental (misinformed/misviewed/etc.) as well as intentional. There are certainly people out there who are willing to do things they no to be evil in order to gain something (see - Dr. Faustus). or even just to do evil (a pure villian, see - The Joker). And while I am using fictional characters as examples, that doesn't make it any less true (I simply chose them for their strong archetypal resemblance to what I was talking about).
Comte-Sponville says that mercy is rarer and more difficult a virtue than compassion because it is more difficult. He continues on by saying, "The reason is this: mercy takes some reflection, whereas pity can quite easily get by quite easily without it. What does the merciful person think about? Does he reflect on himself and his own many sins? Quite possibly, and if he does, he may be dissuaded from casting the first stone..." (C-S, 120) This idea of reflection is interesting to me. C-S explains that we find reflection many times necessary to be merciful. We reflect about what was wrongly done against us, humanity, etc. and we try to relate. Usually, if we are able to relate to the wrongdoing (say, perhaps, we have committed it ourselves) we are usually able to more easily forgive. However, when the wrongdoing exceeds our own experience or even our imagination, mercy becomes a much more difficult, tricky, and rare virtue. If we can't imagine ourselves committing an atrocious action, but are trying to forgive another for doing it, our job becomes infinitely harder. Forgiveness takes a relation to the object of forgiveness, and if what they have done is far beyond our realm of possible actions, it becomes extremely difficult to truly forgive, to exhibit mercy.
In answer to one of JJ's questions about the Jankelevitch quote "After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive." (Jankelevitch in C-S, 128) and C-S's response, "Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but not the SS?” (C-S, 128) I think these quotes are two of my favorites from the chapter. It goes back to the idea of relating. We may never be able to understand why the Nazis were able to commit the atrocities against human beings that they committed. I think Jankelevitch is suggesting that we may be able to "forgive" these people, but that we will never understand how/why/what they did. So perhaps to him, we don't have to relate in order to forgive, we just have to will forgiveness and to "refuse to partake of it [evil]." (Jankelevitch in C-S, 125) However, C-S believes that we can understand evil just like we can understand good. Just because something is evil does not make it irrational to C-S. He says that we must understand it, or else how will we be able to fight it? I tend to agree more with C-S's point of view. The Nazis were human beings using human reason, and even though their actions were evil, they were real, and we must try to understand it (as C-S points out historians do) so that we can combat evil and do our best never to allow it to happen again. In summary, to C-S, the idea of being able to relate, to understand, that I discussed earlier seems more important to mercy than to Jankelevitch, and therefore I think I tend to agree with C-S on this particular issue.
I also agree with Karlie in that Mercy can apply to anyone who has wronged us, and that hate does not need to be a prerequisite to be merciful. I really enjoyed this section on Mercy, and was drawn to the point he makes in the story of Spinoza. He talks about how Spinoza got stabbed by a radical, and although he forgave his attacker, he always kept the pierced jerkin as a reminder. I think this is an important point and goes against some people's mindset of "forgive and forget". While I think it's necessary to forgive someone who has wronged me, I also think it is just as essential to learn from that experience. This does not mean that I dwell on it because that would mean that I have not put the incident behind me yet and not truly been merciful. I know this can be hard, and I'm sure everyone has experienced this at some point in their lives. The key to remember is that at a certain point, holding a grudge against someone no longer affects the object of the grudge, but rather it affects the person holding the grudge. The one who committed the wrong probably has forgotten the incident or didn't even take note of it in the first place, hence the grudge is ineffectual in the regard that it is not harming the wrongdoer. On the other hand, the person holding the grudge is still dwelling in the past, and by not moving on, the hate is just building up and they are now hindering themselves. Obviously, it is best for both the wronged and the wrongdoer to receive and give out mercy. By showing mercy, we move past the human instincts to want to get back at someone for something they did against us, and rather rise above that feeling. Human beings naturally make mistakes and sometimes in the process can hurt other people. This happens to everyone, and this is why mercy is crucial. No one is perfect, therefore there is no way that someone should say that they are above showing mercy. It goes along with C-S' reference to the biblical story of throwing stones. The men who are free from sin can cast the first stone at the sinful woman, yet none of them are innocent and she goes unpunished. Mercy is such an important virtue and really helps us relate to our fellow men. I also liked how C-S noted that we should show mercy on ourselves too. Sometimes we make horrible mistakes that cause us regret later. The fact of life, however, is that the past cannot be rewritten, and the only option left is to move forward, forgive, and learn from those past mistakes.
"We bear no grudge against the rain for falling or lightning for striking, and consequently there is nothing to forgive them for." Am I misinterpreting C-S here by saying that natural phenomena is excused from mercy, because there is no occasion for it? Or is not bearing a grudge just being merciful in general?
Did Ahab bear a grudge against Moby Dick? Would I hold a grudge against a tornado that killed my family? If we could capture them, make them contained phenomena, then I think we would take them to trial if we could. Isn't this what happened to Job?
One aspect of mercy that has always fascinated me is examined in a G.K. Chesterton story called "The Chief Mourner of Marne." There's a line in that says "people only forgive sins they don't really think sinful." I think that attitude is very prevalent in our society (and every society, I assume, I doubt we're that exceptional). Lots of people are perfectly willing to forgive things that are technically "wrong" but they don't really have a problem with. For example, President Clinton cheated on his wife and perjured himself, but that didn't really hurt anyone not involved and most Americans were pretty willing to just forgive him. But someone who, say, rapes someone cannot expect forgiveness or mercy from anyone.
Obviously the one offense is much worse than the other. But still, I think that mercy calls for us to forgive both, not just the one we don't really care about in the first place. That is, I think, the whole point of mercy, and is what makes mercy such a difficult virtue.
Also, it is important to separate mercy from the legal consequences of an action. Society, necessarily, imposes penalties for crimes, and it seems stupid to me to suggest that society should waive those penalties in the name of mercy. So mercy does not equal forgiveness of consequences for actions.
I don't think that understanding is necessary for mercy, or even an issue really. If we can understand something it is easier to forgive it. Most people can understand some kinds of evil; other kinds, such as child abuse or genocide, are harder to understand. But if we are called to forgive everyone, then being unable to understand their actions, I think, means that our forgiveness is even more meritorious.
CS’ definitions of mercy confused me. He says that it is, “the virtue of forgiveness—or, better yet, truth” (pg.118). Then on the next page, he says, mercy “is concerned with wrongdoing, which is often painless, at least for those who wrong” (119). The first definition made sense. The second, however, confused me. Only those who do wrong can receive mercy? That is just not right in my opinion. Those who are sick and choose to stop receiving treatment are choosing mercy as to not have to go through the pain of treatments and surgeries, which might not cure them anyway.
“A singular and limited virtue yet sufficiently difficult, and sufficiently commendable, to make it one. For our misdeeds are too numerous, and we ourselves are all of us too wretched, too weak, and too vile for it to be unnecessary” (119). I thought this was perfect. We all are capable of doing wrong. We hurt people emotionally and sometimes even physically. We piss people off. We say the wrong thing. We do stupid shit. This all requires mercy in the form of forgiveness. We screw up and whomever we offended has to forgive us and show us mercy for our mistakes. If we were not shown mercy, we would all be alone without friends because people would have stopped talking to us. And then the world would really be screwed up.
JJ said, “Do you agree with Jankelevitch—what he says on pg. 128, that “After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive?” “Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but no the SS?” (128)—I love that line and I agree with C-S whole-heartedly, but I can see where Jankelevitch is coming from. Which viewpoint do you understand.” This was an interesting thing to read. We can understand and explain (at least partially) why the Nazi’s did what they did, but that doesn’t mean we need to forgive them. Just because I understand what they did does not mean I forgive them. Chances are I will never forgive the Nazi’s for what they did. We can explain all of those listed by CS but that doesn’t mean we have to forgive them, in my opinion at least.
I'd love for C-S to draw a clear line between forgiveness and mercy. Does forgiveness require an act of mercy? Is mercy something greater or lesser than general forgiveness? There seems to be a little ambiguity here. He says: "to forgive is to accept"(122) but refers to mercy as an end to hate. My assumption has always been that a merciful person will avoid vengeance and not hate. This seems somewhat close to C-S's idea of mercy, but the aspect of forgiveness throws a wrench in the works. I agree with his concept of mercy being "truly a gift, not an exchance" (130), but the difference between forgiveness and mercy is clouded.
I really like Compte-Sponville’s statement that Michael also quotes when he says that mercy "eliminates not the wrong but the resentment, not the memory but the anger…" (130). Mercy asks us to try to understand where someone might be coming from when he or she commits an evil or even why the person did such a horrible thing. It asks us to understand so that we might be able to forgive or at least not be as harsh towards an individual who has done a great wrong. C-S points out that mercy does not mean we can or should try to ever forget what someone did but rather seek to understand why and then forgive or at least show lenience.
In response, however to the question asking if we must first have hatred in order to show mercy, I must argue that we do not. Can I not show mercy towards someone who has wronged me without hating the individual? Can we not show mercy to individuals we do not even know? How would we be able to show those strangers mercy if we did not first hate them for some reason? I am fairly certain that we can show people, even strangers who have perhaps committed horrible atrocities, mercy without hating them.
Karlie’s point about Christ is an excellent one. Did Christ not show mercy toward all of humankind? He did. He also did not hate anyone. Not even close. He showed mercy toward those who brutally murdered them and never hated them. He prayed that the Father might forgive them even as they were nailing his hands and feet to cross. That sounds like mercy without hatred to me.
Also, I think we show mercy to those who commit little wrongs against us practically every day. My sister might do something to really aggravate me, but I do not hate her. Brief anger and outright hatred are entirely different things. And, even if I might be momentarily angered by her action, I definitely do not hate her, and I perhaps can even understand why she did something mean to me and forgive her. Even if I cannot understand what she did or why she did it, I can still show her mercy.
That is true for all kinds of individuals; even if we try and cannot fathom why or how they did something, we can still show mercy, even if for no reason other than a love for humanity and general desire for peace instead of hatred.
I just had a random thought... Could mercy be choosing not to hate and/or ceasing hate?
Christ could have hated his murderers, but he chose not to, and showed mercy. If someone punches me in the mouth, I can choose to hate him or choose to love him anyway and show mercy by not slugging him back.
Mercy and penalties should be two separate things. You cannot lift penalties in the name of mercy. For one thing, the judge or whoever is imposing the penalty really has no stake in the matter. It is not his or her position to grant mercy. If somebody murders my mother, I don't want some random judge deciding that now is the time to start being more virtuous, and give the murderer a light sentence. It is not hard for him to be merciful in that situation. And even if I did have a merciful attitude toward the murderer, he still needs to have a penalty. I think that it is possible to be merciful toward somebody who has wronged you, and still want a penalty to be enforced against them. For example, if somebody vandalizes my house, I could forgive them. But I would still want them make up for it by picking up all the tp and clean up the egg streaks on my windows. Catholics believe in Purgatory. Even though God has forgiven us for our sins, there is still a period of penance and purification that we have to go through. JJ Ruwe
In this chapter on mercy, I disagreed with some points and loved others. Comte-Sponville presents many differing opinions in this chapter, and I’m posing a bunch of questions here that bothered or struck me in some way.
ReplyDeleteC-S says that mercy is forgiveness of hate. That mercy must come after hate, real hate. Can I not be utterly disgusted, can you not utterly reject and renounce another’s actions, and still love them?
And he assumes, with his entire definition of mercy, that you cannot love and hate someone at the same time. Can a wife not have unconditional love for her unfaithful husband but still hate him when she finds out? This is, perhaps, a question of semantics, if you just define hate as the absence of love. What do you think?
Is evil merely an error? Meaning that the evil do not truly choose evil—they are simply misinformed or unable to understand what is evil? Can we ever know for sure either way?
“Knowledge makes forgiveness both inescapable but superfluous.” Is this really true? Say you do know every last detail of that Nazi C-S loves to talk about so much’s life. You know everything. Can’t you still imagine that you would need to forgive him? Or no, do you think if you know every last detail, you can empathize with his choices and what in his life lead him to that point? Forgiveness would become superfluous?
Do you agree with Jankelevitch—what he says on pg. 128, that “After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive?” “Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but no the SS?” (128)—I love that line and I agree with C-S whole-heartedly, but I can see where Jankelevitch is coming from. Which viewpoint do you understand
“can we and should we forgive those who have never asked forgiveness?” (129)
“loving one’s enemies… means fighting them joyously,” (130)—to what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
I truly enjoyed Comte-Sponville’s chapter on mercy, and I must admit that it brought about a sort of revelation for me. Unfortunately, it is easy to experience hate toward another human being. In many cases, in fact, we might feel that this hatred is justified—perhaps even that we are superior for feeling it. Consider, for example, rapists. The vast majority of people would probably agree that they hate rapists, and that it makes sense to feel that way. Because committing rape is totally wrong and implausible, we condemn rapists for their actions and hate them for making the choices that they do, especially if they affect us personally. While hatred might be a normal response to the atrocities committed by others, reading C-S’s account of mercy made me realize that, by feeling hateful, we are merely punishing ourselves. On page 125, he states that, “Mercy leaves hatred to the hateful, wickedness to the wicked, resentment to the resentful.” I particularly enjoy this definition. To apply mercy is to free ourselves from the hatred that we subconsciously let eat away at our own happiness.
ReplyDeleteBecause mercy is such a positive and admirable quality, it is truly interesting to me that it can only exist in the absence of love and the presence of evil. C-S makes some points in regard to this concept that I especially enjoy. If the essence of mercy is the ability to forgive and to let go of hatred, it is thus impossible to display mercy toward those whom we love. C-S states that, “We are inept at love, and utterly so when it comes to the wicked. This is precisely why we need to be merciful!” (page 121) What makes us unable to love the wicked is completely contrary to the beliefs of Socrates; wickedness is brought about by evil, and evil is knowingly committed (page 123).
The one realm I feel that C-S could perhaps explain a bit more is that of punishment. Should mercy abound in the justice system? Take, for example, the example of a child abuser (page 125). When we learn that the abuser was himself abused as a child, we might be more apt to understand his situation and forgive him. Should our justice system work the same way? If it did, what would become of punishment? Later in the chapter, C-S quotes Jankélévitch: “Before forgiveness can even be considered, the offender must cease challenging his guilt and acknowledge it, making no pleas in his own defense or calling on extenuating circumstances…” Should we take this to mean that we should have mercy on criminals who accept their guilt and repent? And, if this is the case, how should they be punished? This is the only inconsistency I find within this chapter.
Mercy "elimates not the wrong but the resentment, not the memory but the anger…" (130). Just as the compassionate person recognizes the sufferer as his or her equal, the merciful person simiarly sees those who commit wrong as an equal as well. That is why Sponville states that mercy "lays the foundation for love…" (130). Through mercy does it become possible for one to truly love another, for in order to truly, they must be on equal terms with one another.
ReplyDeleteWhile mercy grants equality, it is not love. Indeed, Sponville says mercy replaces love "...when love would be premature" (130). For example, Spinoza forgave the people who tried to stab him. If he met those same people again, he would not wish to do harm against them or take revenge, for mercy erased those feelings for revenge. However, his killers would have to earn his trust back, just like every other man, but at least his mercy allows them to be seen as men at all. It allows them to start from square 1 rather than be disqualified.
By saying that mercy "elimates…hatred" and saying that mercy allows for the possibility love, Sponville seems to be setting love and hate as polar opposites that cannot coexist. Is this true? JJ's discussion of the husband and wife raises such an argument. In JJ's case, the wife had "unconditional love" for her husband; therefore, that love is contractual rather than emotional. Sponville deals with a similar scenario, in which he concludes that a parent will always have a loving bond for his or her child. In essence, the wife's "unconditional love" is waiting behind the fleeting, emotionally-driven hatred to come back out in its emotional form after the feelings of anger wash over.
If the hatred is long-lasting, can there be love? That depends. If the wife's hatred blinds her to her husband, then love cannot be there. He does not have a chance to prove he is a better man than his unfaithfulness shows because no matter what he does, she will refuse to accept it.
However, if through mercy the wife does not become blind to her husband, then it is possible for the husband and wife to regain their former love or be even more loving. Through mercy, the wife has hatred for the quality of recklessness or feebleness in her husband, but she does not hate her whole husband. She forgives his actions and gives him the opportunity to earn her affectionate, emotional love back by proving his qualities can change. "Unconditional" love, the fact that they are husband and wife, may help push her towards offering mercy.
Therefore, "unconditional" love continues to exist if hatred is only partial, and affectionate love may return eventually through mercy. However, if hate takes over a person, then affectionate love has no chance and "unconditional" love is lost in the fray. The hope for "unconditional" love is that as their marital bonds keep them together, mercy may enter at some point in time. Unfortunately, many couples divorce or simply leave each other before this extended stage begins.
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ReplyDeleteAs JJ prompted, "C-S says that mercy is forgiveness of hate. That mercy must come after hate, real hate." After reading this statement by C-S, I was greatly troubled. I most commonly relate the word "mercy" to my relationship with Christ and His forgiveness of my sins (which matches C-S's original definition of mercy as "the virtue of forgiveness" (118)). C-S suggests that in order for mercy to occur, hate must first be present. I feel that he has taken this definition to an extreme that is most definitely not always true.
ReplyDeleteDid I ever hate Christ? Did Christ ever hate me? But, yet, he still shows me mercy every day. Sometimes we may act as if we hate someone by treating them in a hateful way, denying their authority, or treating them with utter disrespect, however, the true feeling of hate must not always be present. We can commit a wrong against someone and not hate them at all, but love them all the while. I do not always treat others that I love as I should, but that doesn't mean that I hate them, nor do they hate me.
I feel that C-S's definition of mercy should be softened. We can definitely show mercy to those that we hate or to those who have hated us, but we can also show mercy to a person we love who has hurt our feelings by a harsh comment spoken out of anger, not hatred. I do not believe that hatred is a prerequisite to mercy at all, bur rather a simple "wrongdoing" that needs forgiven. Anyone agree?
“Compassion, as we saw earlier, is concerned with suffering and most suffering is innocent. Mercy, on the other hand, is concerned with wrongdoing, which is often painless, at least for those who wrong” (119) I would argue that mercy is one of the most difficult virtues for one to possess. It requires one to let go the wrong that another has committed against you and not retaliate. I found this chapter in C-S to be my favorite thus far. Mercy is an incredibly interesting virtue, and one of the most unattainable virtues. We all know how difficult it is to truly let go of the hatred we hold for someone when we have justifiable reasons to hate them.
ReplyDeleteWhile this is one of my favorite virtues and chapters that we have read, I was somewhat confused about the stance taken by C-S in regard to the relation of mercy and forgiveness. C-S seems to treat mercy and forgiveness somewhat like synonyms. But does mercy really require forgiveness? It is certainly possible to show mercy to someone without forgiving them. You can hold on to your hatred of a person and not retaliate against them, but is this mercy? and is mercy that continues to hold on to hatred and resentment still virtuous? In my opinion, it is really forgiveness that is the virtue, not mercy and while C-S will disagree with me, I do not believe the two are one in the same.
C-S states “to forgive does not mean to erase – or to forget…It means that one has ceased to hate , which is the definition of mercy: the virtue that triumphs over rancor, over justified hatred (in this respect mercy goes beyond justice), over resentment, over the desire for revenge or punishment; the virtue that forgives, not by expunging the wrong – an impossible charge, in any case – but stilling the grudge we bear against the person who offended or harmed us” (119). I disagree with this comparison of mercy and forgiveness. There have been many families of murder victims that have argued for their loved one’s killers to be spared from the death penalty, not because they have forgiven the killer, but because they do not believe in taking someone’s life regardless of the crime. They still hate the murderer, they do not forgive him or her but there is no doubt that they are showing mercy.
In response to Karlie, I'd have to agree with the fact that the definition needs softening. On the note of hate towards/received from Christ (or another god for the other religions), I feel as if this "rule" C-S has stated probably is moot, considering that they are the divine, transcending normal human limits. Just a little conjecture there.
ReplyDeleteMercy is a factor in the justice system for a reason. That's the reason why we have judges, jury, trials, etc. If one were to take the human element (and therefore the possibility mercy, as well as compassion) and a "formla" were made to somehow equate what each crime should equal in punishments, the system woud be less effective.
“can we and should we forgive those who have never asked forgiveness?” (129)- jj quoting C-S. I'm going to go out on a limb here and say, yes. To quote a wise man, "No, not seven times," Jesus replied, "but seventy times seven!" when asked how many times one should forgive another. And essentially, that 70x7 was intended to be such a big number as to imply that you should always forgive one another. Besides which, forgiveness is a healthy thing to do, for the individual and the society without taking away negative consequences for the wrongdoer persay.
"Is evil merely an error? Meaning that the evil do not truly choose evil—they are simply misinformed or unable to understand what is evil? Can we ever know for sure either way?" - JJ. I love this question. It was and still is one of my favorite questions to shoot back at people in, say, a religion class on morals. Though I tend to pose the question in a "What if it wasn't evil for them in their position to do so" (whici I then usually promptly receive the answer that there are things intrinsicly evil, like rape, which if you think about this answer, it isn't a sufficient response, given that it only covers one action)? I think that evil truly can be both accidental (misinformed/misviewed/etc.) as well as intentional. There are certainly people out there who are willing to do things they no to be evil in order to gain something (see - Dr. Faustus). or even just to do evil (a pure villian, see - The Joker). And while I am using fictional characters as examples, that doesn't make it any less true (I simply chose them for their strong archetypal resemblance to what I was talking about).
posted by - john. n
Comte-Sponville says that mercy is rarer and more difficult a virtue than compassion because it is more difficult. He continues on by saying, "The reason is this: mercy takes some reflection, whereas pity can quite easily get by quite easily without it. What does the merciful person think about? Does he reflect on himself and his own many sins? Quite possibly, and if he does, he may be dissuaded from casting the first stone..." (C-S, 120) This idea of reflection is interesting to me. C-S explains that we find reflection many times necessary to be merciful. We reflect about what was wrongly done against us, humanity, etc. and we try to relate. Usually, if we are able to relate to the wrongdoing (say, perhaps, we have committed it ourselves) we are usually able to more easily forgive. However, when the wrongdoing exceeds our own experience or even our imagination, mercy becomes a much more difficult, tricky, and rare virtue. If we can't imagine ourselves committing an atrocious action, but are trying to forgive another for doing it, our job becomes infinitely harder. Forgiveness takes a relation to the object of forgiveness, and if what they have done is far beyond our realm of possible actions, it becomes extremely difficult to truly forgive, to exhibit mercy.
ReplyDeleteIn answer to one of JJ's questions about the Jankelevitch quote "After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive." (Jankelevitch in C-S, 128) and C-S's response, "Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but not the SS?” (C-S, 128) I think these quotes are two of my favorites from the chapter. It goes back to the idea of relating. We may never be able to understand why the Nazis were able to commit the atrocities against human beings that they committed. I think Jankelevitch is suggesting that we may be able to "forgive" these people, but that we will never understand how/why/what they did. So perhaps to him, we don't have to relate in order to forgive, we just have to will forgiveness and to "refuse to partake of it [evil]." (Jankelevitch in C-S, 125) However, C-S believes that we can understand evil just like we can understand good. Just because something is evil does not make it irrational to C-S. He says that we must understand it, or else how will we be able to fight it? I tend to agree more with C-S's point of view. The Nazis were human beings using human reason, and even though their actions were evil, they were real, and we must try to understand it (as C-S points out historians do) so that we can combat evil and do our best never to allow it to happen again. In summary, to C-S, the idea of being able to relate, to understand, that I discussed earlier seems more important to mercy than to Jankelevitch, and therefore I think I tend to agree with C-S on this particular issue.
I also agree with Karlie in that Mercy can apply to anyone who has wronged us, and that hate does not need to be a prerequisite to be merciful. I really enjoyed this section on Mercy, and was drawn to the point he makes in the story of Spinoza. He talks about how Spinoza got stabbed by a radical, and although he forgave his attacker, he always kept the pierced jerkin as a reminder. I think this is an important point and goes against some people's mindset of "forgive and forget". While I think it's necessary to forgive someone who has wronged me, I also think it is just as essential to learn from that experience. This does not mean that I dwell on it because that would mean that I have not put the incident behind me yet and not truly been merciful. I know this can be hard, and I'm sure everyone has experienced this at some point in their lives. The key to remember is that at a certain point, holding a grudge against someone no longer affects the object of the grudge, but rather it affects the person holding the grudge. The one who committed the wrong probably has forgotten the incident or didn't even take note of it in the first place, hence the grudge is ineffectual in the regard that it is not harming the wrongdoer. On the other hand, the person holding the grudge is still dwelling in the past, and by not moving on, the hate is just building up and they are now hindering themselves. Obviously, it is best for both the wronged and the wrongdoer to receive and give out mercy. By showing mercy, we move past the human instincts to want to get back at someone for something they did against us, and rather rise above that feeling. Human beings naturally make mistakes and sometimes in the process can hurt other people. This happens to everyone, and this is why mercy is crucial. No one is perfect, therefore there is no way that someone should say that they are above showing mercy. It goes along with C-S' reference to the biblical story of throwing stones. The men who are free from sin can cast the first stone at the sinful woman, yet none of them are innocent and she goes unpunished. Mercy is such an important virtue and really helps us relate to our fellow men. I also liked how C-S noted that we should show mercy on ourselves too. Sometimes we make horrible mistakes that cause us regret later. The fact of life, however, is that the past cannot be rewritten, and the only option left is to move forward, forgive, and learn from those past mistakes.
ReplyDelete"We bear no grudge against the rain for falling or lightning for striking, and consequently there is nothing to forgive them for." Am I misinterpreting C-S here by saying that natural phenomena is excused from mercy, because there is no occasion for it? Or is not bearing a grudge just being merciful in general?
ReplyDeleteDid Ahab bear a grudge against Moby Dick? Would I hold a grudge against a tornado that killed my family? If we could capture them, make them contained phenomena, then I think we would take them to trial if we could. Isn't this what happened to Job?
One aspect of mercy that has always fascinated me is examined in a G.K. Chesterton story called "The Chief Mourner of Marne." There's a line in that says "people only forgive sins they don't really think sinful." I think that attitude is very prevalent in our society (and every society, I assume, I doubt we're that exceptional). Lots of people are perfectly willing to forgive things that are technically "wrong" but they don't really have a problem with. For example, President Clinton cheated on his wife and perjured himself, but that didn't really hurt anyone not involved and most Americans were pretty willing to just forgive him. But someone who, say, rapes someone cannot expect forgiveness or mercy from anyone.
ReplyDeleteObviously the one offense is much worse than the other. But still, I think that mercy calls for us to forgive both, not just the one we don't really care about in the first place. That is, I think, the whole point of mercy, and is what makes mercy such a difficult virtue.
Also, it is important to separate mercy from the legal consequences of an action. Society, necessarily, imposes penalties for crimes, and it seems stupid to me to suggest that society should waive those penalties in the name of mercy. So mercy does not equal forgiveness of consequences for actions.
I don't think that understanding is necessary for mercy, or even an issue really. If we can understand something it is easier to forgive it. Most people can understand some kinds of evil; other kinds, such as child abuse or genocide, are harder to understand. But if we are called to forgive everyone, then being unable to understand their actions, I think, means that our forgiveness is even more meritorious.
CS’ definitions of mercy confused me. He says that it is, “the virtue of forgiveness—or, better yet, truth” (pg.118). Then on the next page, he says, mercy “is concerned with wrongdoing, which is often painless, at least for those who wrong” (119). The first definition made sense. The second, however, confused me. Only those who do wrong can receive mercy? That is just not right in my opinion. Those who are sick and choose to stop receiving treatment are choosing mercy as to not have to go through the pain of treatments and surgeries, which might not cure them anyway.
ReplyDelete“A singular and limited virtue yet sufficiently difficult, and sufficiently commendable, to make it one. For our misdeeds are too numerous, and we ourselves are all of us too wretched, too weak, and too vile for it to be unnecessary” (119). I thought this was perfect. We all are capable of doing wrong. We hurt people emotionally and sometimes even physically. We piss people off. We say the wrong thing. We do stupid shit. This all requires mercy in the form of forgiveness. We screw up and whomever we offended has to forgive us and show us mercy for our mistakes. If we were not shown mercy, we would all be alone without friends because people would have stopped talking to us. And then the world would really be screwed up.
JJ said, “Do you agree with Jankelevitch—what he says on pg. 128, that “After Auschwitz, to understand is not to forgive?” “Do we mean to say that we can explain Einstein, Mozart, or Jean Moulin but no the SS?” (128)—I love that line and I agree with C-S whole-heartedly, but I can see where Jankelevitch is coming from. Which viewpoint do you understand.” This was an interesting thing to read. We can understand and explain (at least partially) why the Nazi’s did what they did, but that doesn’t mean we need to forgive them. Just because I understand what they did does not mean I forgive them. Chances are I will never forgive the Nazi’s for what they did. We can explain all of those listed by CS but that doesn’t mean we have to forgive them, in my opinion at least.
I'd love for C-S to draw a clear line between forgiveness and mercy. Does forgiveness require an act of mercy? Is mercy something greater or lesser than general forgiveness? There seems to be a little ambiguity here. He says: "to forgive is to accept"(122) but refers to mercy as an end to hate. My assumption has always been that a merciful person will avoid vengeance and not hate. This seems somewhat close to C-S's idea of mercy, but the aspect of forgiveness throws a wrench in the works. I agree with his concept of mercy being "truly a gift, not an exchance" (130), but the difference between forgiveness and mercy is clouded.
ReplyDeleteI really like Compte-Sponville’s statement that Michael also quotes when he says that mercy "eliminates not the wrong but the resentment, not the memory but the anger…" (130). Mercy asks us to try to understand where someone might be coming from when he or she commits an evil or even why the person did such a horrible thing. It asks us to understand so that we might be able to forgive or at least not be as harsh towards an individual who has done a great wrong. C-S points out that mercy does not mean we can or should try to ever forget what someone did but rather seek to understand why and then forgive or at least show lenience.
ReplyDeleteIn response, however to the question asking if we must first have hatred in order to show mercy, I must argue that we do not. Can I not show mercy towards someone who has wronged me without hating the individual? Can we not show mercy to individuals we do not even know? How would we be able to show those strangers mercy if we did not first hate them for some reason? I am fairly certain that we can show people, even strangers who have perhaps committed horrible atrocities, mercy without hating them.
Karlie’s point about Christ is an excellent one. Did Christ not show mercy toward all of humankind? He did. He also did not hate anyone. Not even close. He showed mercy toward those who brutally murdered them and never hated them. He prayed that the Father might forgive them even as they were nailing his hands and feet to cross. That sounds like mercy without hatred to me.
Also, I think we show mercy to those who commit little wrongs against us practically every day. My sister might do something to really aggravate me, but I do not hate her. Brief anger and outright hatred are entirely different things. And, even if I might be momentarily angered by her action, I definitely do not hate her, and I perhaps can even understand why she did something mean to me and forgive her. Even if I cannot understand what she did or why she did it, I can still show her mercy.
That is true for all kinds of individuals; even if we try and cannot fathom why or how they did something, we can still show mercy, even if for no reason other than a love for humanity and general desire for peace instead of hatred.
I just had a random thought... Could mercy be choosing not to hate and/or ceasing hate?
ReplyDeleteChrist could have hated his murderers, but he chose not to, and showed mercy. If someone punches me in the mouth, I can choose to hate him or choose to love him anyway and show mercy by not slugging him back.
Mercy and penalties should be two separate things. You cannot lift penalties in the name of mercy. For one thing, the judge or whoever is imposing the penalty really has no stake in the matter. It is not his or her position to grant mercy. If somebody murders my mother, I don't want some random judge deciding that now is the time to start being more virtuous, and give the murderer a light sentence. It is not hard for him to be merciful in that situation. And even if I did have a merciful attitude toward the murderer, he still needs to have a penalty. I think that it is possible to be merciful toward somebody who has wronged you, and still want a penalty to be enforced against them. For example, if somebody vandalizes my house, I could forgive them. But I would still want them make up for it by picking up all the tp and clean up the egg streaks on my windows. Catholics believe in Purgatory. Even though God has forgiven us for our sins, there is still a period of penance and purification that we have to go through.
ReplyDeleteJJ Ruwe