"The fight for justice is unending" (85). How true this statement made by Compte-Sponville rings out today. In this chapter, C-S takes the time to go through the meaning of justice as defined by many of the great philosophers throughout history. He notes that it is the last of the four cardinal virtues and states that it is "probably the only one (virtue) that is an absolute good in itself" (61). The other three cardinal virtues, C-S argues, are only good when they serve good ends but can also be used for evil. Justice alone is good in simply itself and allows the other virtues to exist. C-S defines it as "the principle that allows them (the other virtues) to coexist" (61). For example, there can never be a case of something being good and unjust. We cannot justify doing something for the good of the majority while some suffer greatly to bring about that good. That would be unjust.
So then, what would be just? What is justice? C-S explains that it is a term typically used to mean legality or equality (62). This can be seen in the way we equate justice to the law. I mean, we even call th judges on our Supreme Court "justices." The matter of equality as justice is visible in the way we define social justice, typically associated with the church or other NGO's that do social work and seek to promote equality among individuals and help the underpriveleged to live a better life. However, the law is not necessarily fair or equal, so therefore, how can it be just? Also, people are never really equal. Ever. So, how can justice ever be brought to complete fruition? It can't. As long as humankind is a rational-minded entity, justice will never be absolutely attained as a marriage of legality and equality. That is why justice is "a never-ending task, a constantly threatened achievement," (71) as C-S states.
There are arguments made as to cases in which justice would be attainable. Rawls's "veil of ignorance" (72) is one such case. In this supposition, Rawls encourages people to imagine themselves in an "original position" (72) in which no one has any characteristics that make them unique. Only then could we truly ever be equal because we would have no idea, being ignorant, of what we are to become and therefore can only ensure our own best interest by ensuring that of everyone else. Hume also had five hypotheses of when justice could actually be attained. He said that only in the case of 1) extreme abundance, 2) universal love, 3) extreme and generalized poverty or violence, 4) radical inequality of stregnth and power or 5) the complete separation of individuals would justice be possible (76). C-S goes on to argue that justice would still be impossible, especially in the case of number four, which is rather alarming, because how can there be justice when, in effect, some people are being denied their basic human rights automatically for being weak. That is most certainly not justice.
Thus, is justice the unnattainable virtue? Under what hypothetical circumstances do you think justice might be attainable? Are there any? Do you think any of Hume's hypotheses would be appropriate situations for fostering justice? Aristotle calls justice "the greatest of virtues," (85) and C-S says it is the "closest to altruism-or to love, the only true altruism" (74); do you agree?
Comte-Sponville obviously feels that justice is one of the most important virtues (take, for example, the fact that he dedicates twenty-six pages to justice and not even six to temperance). I agree with him, and I especially enjoy the example he provides on page 61 to emphasize its importance. While murderers and tyrants can act prudently and temperately, their actions can never in themselves be just; to call them just would completely contradict their nature. It can thus be said that justice, as C-S also mentions on page 61, is perhaps the only virtue that is in itself an absolute good.
While I respect this basic position, I find C-S’s chapter on justice to be full of glaring contradictions. As I just stated, C-S declares that “justice is probably the only one [virtue] that is an absolute good in itself” (page 61). Much later in the chapter, however, C-S defends Spinoza’s view of the extrinsic nature of justice (pages 74-75). Spinoza argues that, in the purest state of nature, nothing belongs to any man—rather, “all things belong to all.” This implies that no man is concerned with altruism or, on the other hand, with taking that which does not belong to him. In such a state of nature, both Spinoza and C-S argue that there is no such thing as justice or injustice. From this logic, we can infer that justice is not natural; it is something that is brought about only when there is a need for it, and it appears that there is only such a need when material goods are introduced. Even in a completely equal society, a society in which the sharing of material goods is never disputed (such a society is purely theoretical and has never/will never exist), I would assume that virtues such as politeness, prudence, and love would still exist because they naturally sprout from the human condition. Can it thus be said that justice is an absolute good in itself if it only can be found in certain conditions? Spinoza’s logic leads me to the conclusion that justice must always accompany injustice; justice can only be created when consciously deciding not to be unjust. Is this true of the other virtues?
I also found what I feel is a stark incongruity in C-S’s definition of justice. He states that justice means one of two things: conformity to the law, or equality or proportionality (page 62). I believe that C-S discusses conformity to the law quite well; he acknowledges that laws are not often just and can only be as just as the lawmaking bodies that produce them. His choice to use ‘equality’ as a defining word for justice, however, confuses me. I mainly feel that he overemphasizes the material use of the word. On page 68, C-S supports the belief of Pascal that “Equality of goods is just” and that “inequality of goods can never be absolutely just , for it dooms some to poverty of death, while others accumulate riches upon riches and pleasures to the point of disgust.” Can this happen in some instances? Sure. And it does. But I would like to use myself as an example to counteract this point. I live well above the poverty line, and even above what would be considered middle-class, and I am perfectly content with that fact. Am I willing to give up all that I have in the name of material equality? Of course not. Would you be? Does that make you or I unjust? I would have to argue that it does not. I consider myself to be a just person; I follow all just laws, and I gladly help people in need. The equality that I emphasize, however, is not that of material goods, but that of opportunities. I will gladly fight to give all individuals the OPPORTUNITY to become as privileged as I am; but I in no way feel that refusing to sacrifice my own self-interest makes me an unjust person.
I thus feel that C-S needs to tweak certain aspects of his definition. If justice truly is the only absolute good, it cannot rely nearly as much on material things.
"We read in Plato that justice is what keeps each person in his place, with his share, and in the function that he is fitted for, thereby perserving the hierarchical harmony of the whole" (64). I agree with Plato, and I agree with Sponville's notion that justice is beyond legality. If the law were based on Utlitarian Ethics, then whatever perserved the greatest utility would be just and right. If the law was based on Natural Rights Theory, then whatever preserves the most freedom is right and just. Utilitarians may say that capital punishment is just, for it preserves the long-time stability of the prison houses, which must have room for minor offenders and thus cannot keep everyone in prison. It would give the community the greatest peace of mind if that murderer or sadist were killed. For the Naturalist Rights laws, then the punished and the victim each have a right to autonomy and peace of mind insofar that each can hold onto the most their freedoms. Thus, the punished can receive a life sentence and still live because that right cannot be violated. According to Plato, justice cannot be self-contradictory, for it provides harmony, order, and a level of predictablity and expectation. Sponville also states that the just person is equitable and equity "is applied justice, living justice, concrete justice. . ." (84). If justice is concrete, then it cannot be changed. And the whole idea of a law, as Sponville does equate to a law, is that it is a guideline and a model on which to everything else. This is even the case in regards to the other virtues. Indeed, Sponville says that "justice is probably the only one that is an absolute good in itself" (61). All the other virtues, including love, receive meaning in accordance with their relation to justice, their model. The model cannot be self-contradictory, or the other virtues would be meaningless.
Therefore, if justice is beyond changeable legality, then what is the driving principle of justice? Justice is "applying the far more flexible, complex demands of the latter" and that treating equally two people who are different (84). In other words, justice is giving everyone an equal foundation from which each individual can choose to succeed or fail. But they have to start at the same line. And like courage, justice works moment to moment. That is why Sponville and Aristotle call for us to forgive those who do fail and not hate those who do wrong. Sponville says, "anger and hatred must be overcome" (85). Because if we hate them, then we hold a bias against them, and that bias will prevent that person from racing on the same starting line with everyone else. Therefore, justice, just as much as mercy, calls to forgive and never hate the person but simply the action. Justice may never be attainable for this reason because it precludes that we erase all baises, and as human beings, biases are inevitable. It is very difficult for us to think equally of everyone. If someone we hate acts kindly to someone, then we may attribute their actions to an alternate motive. However, maybe they were being kind. Sponville describes that to achieve justice, we "begin by resisting the injustice that each of us carries within himself" (85). Therefore, we must all truly believe that everyone has the same potential to succeed in different ways, even in the deepest recesses of our minds.
"In short, justice is a good in itself.." (61) Comte-Sponville here emphasizes the importance of this ever-sought out virtue. C-S suggests that justice is the only virtue that is pure goodness in itself as the other virtues (prudence, temperance, etc.) can be found even in evildoers such as "prudent murderer[s]" and "sober tyrant[s]." (61)
Julie questions, "is justice the unattainable virtue?" I would have to agree with C-S's apparent assertion of this idea. Justice seems to be the virtue that we can never obtain, rooted in the idea that we are all created differently. How can balance and justice be reached for everyone? It is merely impossible. Only could pure justice be obtained in a purely hypothetical situation--somewhat of a Utopia perhaps? A place where we are all perfect. No selfishness. A place where we all have equal abilities, equal wealth, equal size, shape, and treatment. True justice could only be obtained in a place where we are all robotic clones.
Snap back to reality. This earth is filled with a vast variety of individuals, all of us having multiple differences. Because we are different, we will obviously never all be the same. A just Earth is an oxymoron. However, as justice is goodness in itself, we must continue to seek it out ruthlessly.
C-S questions, "What kind of society can there be without laws and a modicum of equality or proportion?" (75) Society without justice would be chaos. This virtue holds such importance that Aristotle even refers it as "the greatest of virtues!" (85) We must practice justice day in an day out, striving to reach pure goodness, however, as humans, we must realize that we are all imperfect and different and this goal, though try as we may, can never fully be reached.
C-S says “we must do our duty, of course, but never at the expense of justice or in opposition to it” (61). I think this is very important. We must strive to do what we are supposed to and follow our elders, teachers, etc. But when they ask us to do something that is unjust, then we do not need to follow that duty.
However, C-S goes on to say that “duty is justice itself, in the form of requirement and obligation” (61). I don’t really agree with this. I don’t think that doing something that you think is wrong or that causes harm to another is just because you feel obligated to do it. That just seems ignorant to me.
C-S discusses the two different definitions of Justice: 1. Conformity to the Law 2. Equality and proportionality. These two are equally important, and C-S agrees as he dedicated an entire 26 pages to them. The first one is just what it sounds like. Acting just in that sense is doing what is right and what the law tells you to do. In this manner, those who speed are not acting justly. The other, to me, is more in the terms of sharing. Everyone has equal opportunity of employment, etc. We are not supposed to treat people differently based on their race, gender, handicap, HAIR COLOR, etc.
“Wealth confers no special rights… Genius and saintliness confer no special rights” (69). I love this. What immediately came to mind was Bill Gates. Cool he is a billionaire. Cool he is super smart. So what? That doesn’t make him any more special than us. It doesn’t make his decisions any better than ours. People who fit any (or all) of these categories should not be anymore entitled than any of us.
In response to Julie’s question: “Is justice unattainable virtue?” I think so. Everyone is made differently. We are all brought up differently and all have different ideas of what is just and what is not. Laws are made to be just for the majority, but what about the minority? Are those that do not think the laws are just and do not follow them, not being just themselves, even though they believe they are? What about people who are homosexual? They can’t marry, or be on the same insurance plan with their significant other. For the most part, this is not a choice. (And I say this knowing numerous people who are in this situation and feel this way.) They do not choose to love someone of the same gender, and they are being punished for it? That is not exactly fair. They, by law, cannot be just if they get married. They cannot attain justice. At least 10% of the population (and that is only those who have the courage to come out of the closet) cannot, by law, be just. Thus, I believe justice is unattainable.
"Justice does not make just people; just people make justice" (66). C-S talks about how acting justly does not necessarily mean following the law, since laws can potentially be unjust and therefore acting justly would be to not follow those particular laws. On the other hand, he goes on to say justice is not only to act in a moral sense because then you must define what exactly morality is. "But the law isn't justice; nor is equality, taken alone" (66).
Another passage I found particularly interesting: "Still, the equality essential to justice is an equality not so much between the object exchanged, which is always open to debate and nearly always possible to come to agreement on (otherwise there would be no exchange), as between the subjects involved in the exchange--not their de facto equality but their equality in rights, which presupposes that they are equally informed and free, at least as far as their interests and the conditions of the exchange are concerned. Some might object that this kind of equality is never fully attained. True, but the just strive toward it; the unjust stand in its way" (69). Basically I took this as those who are just try to make an exchange as fair as possible between themselves and the other person, even if this means putting themselves at a disadvantage they might not have if they acted unjustly. As C-S points out, this might not make the deal as profitable, but "who ever said that justice is easy or profitable" (69). For me, this kind of goes back to the concept of treating others the way you want to be treated: justly.
"'He is called just who has a constant will to render to every man his own"' (74).
What struck me most on the explanation of Justice was the explanation of what is virtuous when the laws of the state are at odds with what we know to be morally just. What is justice then? What law is it more important to follow? I found it interesting that C-S never really answers these questions but instead explains that the answers are subjective to the situation. Sometimes it is right to fight underground against unjust laws and sometimes it is better to quietly fight and sometimes it is better to simply accept the morally unjust law and not fight at all. The one thing that C-S does explicitly state however is that one must never acquiesce to an unjust law at the expense of another innocent person’s life. To answer Julie’s question: Aristotle calls justice "the greatest of virtues," (85) and C-S says it is the "closest to altruism-or to love, the only true altruism" (74); do you agree? I absolutely agree. According to C-S “Whoever said that justice is easy or profitable? It is, but only for the person who is treated justly or who benefits from the just action, and so much the better for him; justice is a virtue, however only for the person who practices it or does it” (69). Justice is a virtue that requires one to do the right thing because it is right. Like fidelity and courage, if mere duty is the true motivation behind one’s acting just, courageous or faithful than one is not virtuous. If one is being truly just, then there is no doubt that justice is closest to altruism.
When discussing this, C-S states “justice is: neither selfishness nor altruism but a pure equivalence of rights as attested or manifested by the interchangeability of individuals” (73). This makes the point that in order to be truly just, when our interests are at odds with another’s (which they a=constantly are) we must be able to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person.
C-S likes to build a case for almost all virtues by calling them the greatest or stating that without one all others would be meaningless. Clearly he is trying to make the point that all of these virtues are tied together and that all arte important, however I think that he makes his case for justice in particular very well. He states “we need justice no matter what virtue we mean to discuss. To speak injudiciously of any virtue is to betray it” (60). Justice is the greatest of all virtues. Without justice other virtues would be somewhat meaningless.
In Comte-Sponville’s chapter on justice, I was most intrigued by his analysis of Hume’s suppositions that try to prove that justice is solely a necessity of society. Hume put forth five hypotheses about five hypothetical situations in which justice would not be necessary, and therefore would not be useful. This struck me as counter-intuitive—aren’t virtues necessary morally regardless of their utilitarian necessity? But, as C-S grants Hume, the fifth supposition, about a world of complete separation of individuals, is an interesting one. If justice is about treating people equitably, then how could justice be possible in isolation? What bothers me about this argument is, couldn’t we use this thought experiment on all the virtues? How could we be loving or have fidelity in isolation? Aren’t the most important aspects of all the virtues in how they relate to other people? And isn’t this supposition nonsensical anyway? Life is, by nature, social. Someone gives birth to us. We do not spontaneously appear hundreds of miles from anyone. So what’s the point of thinking about a world where everyone is in isolation? To me, this hypothetical seems to lose its value as a point of argument since it simply deletes one of the most important variables involved in the equation. The whole point of virtues and morality is that we are living with other people. So okay, there is no justice in solitude—but I don’t see that that proves anything. As far as the other four suppositions go, I agree with C-S nearly completely, and share his horror on Hume’s thinking about a world with drastic differences between the strong and the weak. While I know that people have definitely not used justice in such cases many many times in history, I think that this means that in such cases justice is even more necessary, rather than less so.
JJ, my problem with the isolation case is that it assumes that securely having your own property will insure that one is just. But, it fails to take into account the act of using that property. If property is totally secondary to man, than that means that it doesn't warrant the same sort of attention that other humans receive. So, exploiting the land is better than exploiting other people. Laws that favor man over property are just laws, and so on. It's anthro-centric, as all of C-S's discussions are.
“Wealth confers no special rights… Genius and saintliness confer no special rights” (69). I love this. What immediately came to mind was Bill Gates. Cool he is a billionaire. Cool he is super smart. So what? That doesn’t make him any more special than us. It doesn’t make his decisions any better than ours. /\ | | From Ellen above...
Isn't the rule of proportionality supposed to come into play here? His actions carry a far greater impact on the world than mine do. So, when he does something bad he has to be held accountable in a different way. The greater the position of a person, the greater the repercussions from abuse. But yeah, he's not better than us - just more successful.
I would bring this issue to the assassination of Osama bin Laden. Was the action of the US Govt., as permitted by the executive branch, just? Did participating in such an action make it more just for such an attempt to be made against our country? By endorsing such an activity, we have changed the discussion for what it means to carry out justice and what rights a nation has to respond to offenses.
And in regards to Homosexuals, the marriage issue is a serious one. But they are not being treated unjustly legally - the law may be favoring one class over another, and the law may be unjust - in the same sense that I'm not being treated unjustly legally. Both male Homosexuals and myself have the right to marry women, and both of us do not have the legal ability to marry men (in most places). The law is treating us both in the same manner.
And if C-S's emphasis on Politics being the combination of might and justice, what of religion? Does marriage, as a religious institution, have a right to be treated fairly. By taking the institution of marriage and making it political, one has removed some of the rights from religion. Is it just to deny them their right to choose which relationships they endorse and don't? Or is marriage through a religious idea outdated and irrelevant to discussion of justice.
I'm all for same-sex civil union and I don't particularly care about the term marriage but recognize the weight it carries with some people. Regardless of the terms, I don't think hetero-couples should get preferential treatment from the government simply for arbitrary reasons.
"Also, people are never really equal. Ever." - julie. Its sad to say that this is entirely true, in the sense that everyone will never be on the same level. However, in a rational (non-idealistic/utopian) world, this makes sense. If you chose to view every interaction that includes a want/need, in order for one person to "win"/gain, someone else has to take a loss. Now, is it just that someone had to lose in order for someone else to gain? It doesn't sound like it is, but can there be a case where it is? Also, on the note of people never being equal, this always has to be true; genetically we are all different and, if Darwin is to be believed, the strong pass on their genes etc (although it can be argued that, in modern society, this does not hold true, because we tend to keep as many people alive as possible, no matter their stength or weakness).
"is virtue reserved only for humanity?" - leinaDxbx. I feel as if there is a two part answer to such a question. It is reserved to humanity in the sense that we are the only ones who can practice it (obviously the enviroment cannt make choices, let alone good ones... as for animals, its a drives kind of thing, due to a lack of higher thought). However, that doesn't mean that virute and justice aren't going to be applied to the enviroment as well. In fact, it would be more just to treat the earth in a virtuous manner because then it leaves it in a better condition for your fellow man, really bring this back to a social relationship facet.
this was posted by john n. (my google account won't take for some reason)
Justice, Comte-Sponville says, is a good in itself, and also is a virtue that separates good men from tyrants. A tyrant can be brave, generous, polite, faithful, but they can't be just. So justice is a good in itself.
I agree that justice is a good thing (obviously), but disagree that a tyrant cannot be just. I would say that some of the worst tyrants are the ones who were most aggressively just. (Being tyrants, most if not all of them perverted justice, but that was the basic idea). The whole idea behind communism, really, is justice--that no one should have more than anyone else. And that is not just Marx's belief--Pascal also said that "inequality of goods" is not just. So communism is based on the idea of absolute justice.
Now, most would agree that theoretical communism hasn't really been tried. Maybe. But then, neither has pure capitalism--in even the most capitalistic societies, there has been plenty of government intervention. The same holds true for all systems of government. But there is, I think, something scary in communism's relentless push towards perfect justice. It ignores (as do most people, I think, who argue that inequality is in itself bad), that while people may be equal under the law and in the eyes of God (if you're into God), they aren't identical, and to treat them as such is a recipe for utter disaster. It also ignores reality--if everyone on earth had precisely the same amount of money, all that would accomplish would be to put everyone in grinding poverty.
Another thing: I found the discussion of justice in an isolated system interesting. It seems clear that justice cannot exist in isolation. but I think any discussion of morality is meaningless in a vacuum. Society is what makes us human, and while I'm not a post-modernist, I think that any system of morality must be viewed through the lens of the surrounding society. I think that is a perfectly isolated system, virtue and vice have no meaning.
I would disagree with Daniel that the communist tyrants were seeking perfect justice. I don't see how the whole idea behind communism is justice. To me, justice is each person gets whatever it is that he or she deserves, be this money, respect, or love. To give an equal amount of a good to people who have done an unequal amount to gain that good is not just. If you want an example of a perfectly just government, read Atlas Shrugged. Dagny Taggart has the right idea about justice. To me, the whole idea of unconditional love goes against the idea of justice. How can a parent love a child before it has done anything worth loving for. The whole idea of loving somebody not based on merit does not make any sense. I'm sure that when I have children, I will love them. But it won't make sense to me. Equating justice with the law does not necessarily make sense either. The law changes. The things that Enron did to create their scandal were largely not illegal at the time. However, they were undoubtedly unethical even though they were not outside the bounds of the laws. Also, if justice really is an absolute good, I don't think it can be equated with the law, because an absolute good would not be subject to change. JJ Ruwe
"The fight for justice is unending" (85). How true this statement made by Compte-Sponville rings out today. In this chapter, C-S takes the time to go through the meaning of justice as defined by many of the great philosophers throughout history. He notes that it is the last of the four cardinal virtues and states that it is "probably the only one (virtue) that is an absolute good in itself" (61). The other three cardinal virtues, C-S argues, are only good when they serve good ends but can also be used for evil. Justice alone is good in simply itself and allows the other virtues to exist. C-S defines it as "the principle that allows them (the other virtues) to coexist" (61). For example, there can never be a case of something being good and unjust. We cannot justify doing something for the good of the majority while some suffer greatly to bring about that good. That would be unjust.
ReplyDeleteSo then, what would be just? What is justice? C-S explains that it is a term typically used to mean legality or equality (62). This can be seen in the way we equate justice to the law. I mean, we even call th judges on our Supreme Court "justices." The matter of equality as justice is visible in the way we define social justice, typically associated with the church or other NGO's that do social work and seek to promote equality among individuals and help the underpriveleged to live a better life. However, the law is not necessarily fair or equal, so therefore, how can it be just? Also, people are never really equal. Ever. So, how can justice ever be brought to complete fruition? It can't. As long as humankind is a rational-minded entity, justice will never be absolutely attained as a marriage of legality and equality. That is why justice is "a never-ending task, a constantly threatened achievement," (71) as C-S states.
There are arguments made as to cases in which justice would be attainable. Rawls's "veil of ignorance" (72) is one such case. In this supposition, Rawls encourages people to imagine themselves in an "original position" (72) in which no one has any characteristics that make them unique. Only then could we truly ever be equal because we would have no idea, being ignorant, of what we are to become and therefore can only ensure our own best interest by ensuring that of everyone else. Hume also had five hypotheses of when justice could actually be attained. He said that only in the case of 1) extreme abundance, 2) universal love, 3) extreme and generalized poverty or violence, 4) radical inequality of stregnth and power or 5) the complete separation of individuals would justice be possible (76). C-S goes on to argue that justice would still be impossible, especially in the case of number four, which is rather alarming, because how can there be justice when, in effect, some people are being denied their basic human rights automatically for being weak. That is most certainly not justice.
Thus, is justice the unnattainable virtue? Under what hypothetical circumstances do you think justice might be attainable? Are there any? Do you think any of Hume's hypotheses would be appropriate situations for fostering justice? Aristotle calls justice "the greatest of virtues," (85) and C-S says it is the "closest to altruism-or to love, the only true altruism" (74); do you agree?
Comte-Sponville obviously feels that justice is one of the most important virtues (take, for example, the fact that he dedicates twenty-six pages to justice and not even six to temperance). I agree with him, and I especially enjoy the example he provides on page 61 to emphasize its importance. While murderers and tyrants can act prudently and temperately, their actions can never in themselves be just; to call them just would completely contradict their nature. It can thus be said that justice, as C-S also mentions on page 61, is perhaps the only virtue that is in itself an absolute good.
ReplyDeleteWhile I respect this basic position, I find C-S’s chapter on justice to be full of glaring contradictions. As I just stated, C-S declares that “justice is probably the only one [virtue] that is an absolute good in itself” (page 61). Much later in the chapter, however, C-S defends Spinoza’s view of the extrinsic nature of justice (pages 74-75). Spinoza argues that, in the purest state of nature, nothing belongs to any man—rather, “all things belong to all.” This implies that no man is concerned with altruism or, on the other hand, with taking that which does not belong to him. In such a state of nature, both Spinoza and C-S argue that there is no such thing as justice or injustice. From this logic, we can infer that justice is not natural; it is something that is brought about only when there is a need for it, and it appears that there is only such a need when material goods are introduced. Even in a completely equal society, a society in which the sharing of material goods is never disputed (such a society is purely theoretical and has never/will never exist), I would assume that virtues such as politeness, prudence, and love would still exist because they naturally sprout from the human condition. Can it thus be said that justice is an absolute good in itself if it only can be found in certain conditions? Spinoza’s logic leads me to the conclusion that justice must always accompany injustice; justice can only be created when consciously deciding not to be unjust. Is this true of the other virtues?
I also found what I feel is a stark incongruity in C-S’s definition of justice. He states that justice means one of two things: conformity to the law, or equality or proportionality (page 62). I believe that C-S discusses conformity to the law quite well; he acknowledges that laws are not often just and can only be as just as the lawmaking bodies that produce them. His choice to use ‘equality’ as a defining word for justice, however, confuses me. I mainly feel that he overemphasizes the material use of the word. On page 68, C-S supports the belief of Pascal that “Equality of goods is just” and that “inequality of goods can never be absolutely just , for it dooms some to poverty of death, while others accumulate riches upon riches and pleasures to the point of disgust.” Can this happen in some instances? Sure. And it does. But I would like to use myself as an example to counteract this point. I live well above the poverty line, and even above what would be considered middle-class, and I am perfectly content with that fact. Am I willing to give up all that I have in the name of material equality? Of course not. Would you be? Does that make you or I unjust? I would have to argue that it does not. I consider myself to be a just person; I follow all just laws, and I gladly help people in need. The equality that I emphasize, however, is not that of material goods, but that of opportunities. I will gladly fight to give all individuals the OPPORTUNITY to become as privileged as I am; but I in no way feel that refusing to sacrifice my own self-interest makes me an unjust person.
I thus feel that C-S needs to tweak certain aspects of his definition. If justice truly is the only absolute good, it cannot rely nearly as much on material things.
"We read in Plato that justice is what keeps each person in his place, with his share, and in the function that he is fitted for, thereby perserving the hierarchical harmony of the whole" (64). I agree with Plato, and I agree with Sponville's notion that justice is beyond legality. If the law were based on Utlitarian Ethics, then whatever perserved the greatest utility would be just and right. If the law was based on Natural Rights Theory, then whatever preserves the most freedom is right and just. Utilitarians may say that capital punishment is just, for it preserves the long-time stability of the prison houses, which must have room for minor offenders and thus cannot keep everyone in prison. It would give the community the greatest peace of mind if that murderer or sadist were killed. For the Naturalist Rights laws, then the punished and the victim each have a right to autonomy and peace of mind insofar that each can hold onto the most their freedoms. Thus, the punished can receive a life sentence and still live because that right cannot be violated. According to Plato, justice cannot be self-contradictory, for it provides harmony, order, and a level of predictablity and expectation. Sponville also states that the just person is equitable and equity "is applied justice, living justice, concrete justice. . ." (84). If justice is concrete, then it cannot be changed. And the whole idea of a law, as Sponville does equate to a law, is that it is a guideline and a model on which to everything else. This is even the case in regards to the other virtues. Indeed, Sponville says that "justice is probably the only one that is an absolute good in itself" (61). All the other virtues, including love, receive meaning in accordance with their relation to justice, their model. The model cannot be self-contradictory, or the other virtues would be meaningless.
ReplyDeleteTherefore, if justice is beyond changeable legality, then what is the driving principle of justice? Justice is "applying the far more flexible, complex demands of the latter" and that treating equally two people who are different (84). In other words, justice is giving everyone an equal foundation from which each individual can choose to succeed or fail. But they have to start at the same line. And like courage, justice works moment to moment. That is why Sponville and Aristotle call for us to forgive those who do fail and not hate those who do wrong. Sponville says, "anger and hatred must be overcome" (85). Because if we hate them, then we hold a bias against them, and that bias will prevent that person from racing on the same starting line with everyone else. Therefore, justice, just as much as mercy, calls to forgive and never hate the person but simply the action. Justice may never be attainable for this reason because it precludes that we erase all baises, and as human beings, biases are inevitable. It is very difficult for us to think equally of everyone. If someone we hate acts kindly to someone, then we may attribute their actions to an alternate motive. However, maybe they were being kind. Sponville describes that to achieve justice, we "begin by resisting the injustice that each of us carries within himself" (85). Therefore, we must all truly believe that everyone has the same potential to succeed in different ways, even in the deepest recesses of our minds.
"In short, justice is a good in itself.." (61)
ReplyDeleteComte-Sponville here emphasizes the importance of this ever-sought out virtue. C-S suggests that justice is the only virtue that is pure goodness in itself as the other virtues (prudence, temperance, etc.) can be found even in evildoers such as "prudent murderer[s]" and "sober tyrant[s]." (61)
Julie questions, "is justice the unattainable virtue?" I would have to agree with C-S's apparent assertion of this idea. Justice seems to be the virtue that we can never obtain, rooted in the idea that we are all created differently. How can balance and justice be reached for everyone? It is merely impossible. Only could pure justice be obtained in a purely hypothetical situation--somewhat of a Utopia perhaps? A place where we are all perfect. No selfishness. A place where we all have equal abilities, equal wealth, equal size, shape, and treatment. True justice could only be obtained in a place where we are all robotic clones.
Snap back to reality. This earth is filled with a vast variety of individuals, all of us having multiple differences. Because we are different, we will obviously never all be the same. A just Earth is an oxymoron. However, as justice is goodness in itself, we must continue to seek it out ruthlessly.
C-S questions, "What kind of society can there be without laws and a modicum of equality or proportion?" (75) Society without justice would be chaos. This virtue holds such importance that Aristotle even refers it as "the greatest of virtues!" (85) We must practice justice day in an day out, striving to reach pure goodness, however, as humans, we must realize that we are all imperfect and different and this goal, though try as we may, can never fully be reached.
C-S says “we must do our duty, of course, but never at the expense of justice or in opposition to it” (61). I think this is very important. We must strive to do what we are supposed to and follow our elders, teachers, etc. But when they ask us to do something that is unjust, then we do not need to follow that duty.
ReplyDeleteHowever, C-S goes on to say that “duty is justice itself, in the form of requirement and obligation” (61). I don’t really agree with this. I don’t think that doing something that you think is wrong or that causes harm to another is just because you feel obligated to do it. That just seems ignorant to me.
C-S discusses the two different definitions of Justice:
1. Conformity to the Law
2. Equality and proportionality.
These two are equally important, and C-S agrees as he dedicated an entire 26 pages to them. The first one is just what it sounds like. Acting just in that sense is doing what is right and what the law tells you to do. In this manner, those who speed are not acting justly. The other, to me, is more in the terms of sharing. Everyone has equal opportunity of employment, etc. We are not supposed to treat people differently based on their race, gender, handicap, HAIR COLOR, etc.
“Wealth confers no special rights… Genius and saintliness confer no special rights” (69). I love this. What immediately came to mind was Bill Gates. Cool he is a billionaire. Cool he is super smart. So what? That doesn’t make him any more special than us. It doesn’t make his decisions any better than ours. People who fit any (or all) of these categories should not be anymore entitled than any of us.
In response to Julie’s question: “Is justice unattainable virtue?” I think so. Everyone is made differently. We are all brought up differently and all have different ideas of what is just and what is not. Laws are made to be just for the majority, but what about the minority? Are those that do not think the laws are just and do not follow them, not being just themselves, even though they believe they are? What about people who are homosexual? They can’t marry, or be on the same insurance plan with their significant other. For the most part, this is not a choice. (And I say this knowing numerous people who are in this situation and feel this way.) They do not choose to love someone of the same gender, and they are being punished for it? That is not exactly fair. They, by law, cannot be just if they get married. They cannot attain justice. At least 10% of the population (and that is only those who have the courage to come out of the closet) cannot, by law, be just. Thus, I believe justice is unattainable.
In word my comments always look so much smaller than they do on here...
ReplyDelete"Justice does not make just people; just people make justice" (66). C-S talks about how acting justly does not necessarily mean following the law, since laws can potentially be unjust and therefore acting justly would be to not follow those particular laws. On the other hand, he goes on to say justice is not only to act in a moral sense because then you must define what exactly morality is. "But the law isn't justice; nor is equality, taken alone" (66).
ReplyDeleteAnother passage I found particularly interesting: "Still, the equality essential to justice is an equality not so much between the object exchanged, which is always open to debate and nearly always possible to come to agreement on (otherwise there would be no exchange), as between the subjects involved in the exchange--not their de facto equality but their equality in rights, which presupposes that they are equally informed and free, at least as far as their interests and the conditions of the exchange are concerned. Some might object that this kind of equality is never fully attained. True, but the just strive toward it; the unjust stand in its way" (69). Basically I took this as those who are just try to make an exchange as fair as possible between themselves and the other person, even if this means putting themselves at a disadvantage they might not have if they acted unjustly. As C-S points out, this might not make the deal as profitable, but "who ever said that justice is easy or profitable" (69). For me, this kind of goes back to the concept of treating others the way you want to be treated: justly.
"'He is called just who has a constant will to render to every man his own"' (74).
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ReplyDeleteWhat struck me most on the explanation of Justice was the explanation of what is virtuous when the laws of the state are at odds with what we know to be morally just. What is justice then? What law is it more important to follow? I found it interesting that C-S never really answers these questions but instead explains that the answers are subjective to the situation. Sometimes it is right to fight underground against unjust laws and sometimes it is better to quietly fight and sometimes it is better to simply accept the morally unjust law and not fight at all. The one thing that C-S does explicitly state however is that one must never acquiesce to an unjust law at the expense of another innocent person’s life.
ReplyDeleteTo answer Julie’s question: Aristotle calls justice "the greatest of virtues," (85) and C-S says it is the "closest to altruism-or to love, the only true altruism" (74); do you agree? I absolutely agree. According to C-S “Whoever said that justice is easy or profitable? It is, but only for the person who is treated justly or who benefits from the just action, and so much the better for him; justice is a virtue, however only for the person who practices it or does it” (69). Justice is a virtue that requires one to do the right thing because it is right. Like fidelity and courage, if mere duty is the true motivation behind one’s acting just, courageous or faithful than one is not virtuous. If one is being truly just, then there is no doubt that justice is closest to altruism.
When discussing this, C-S states “justice is: neither selfishness nor altruism but a pure equivalence of rights as attested or manifested by the interchangeability of individuals” (73). This makes the point that in order to be truly just, when our interests are at odds with another’s (which they a=constantly are) we must be able to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person.
C-S likes to build a case for almost all virtues by calling them the greatest or stating that without one all others would be meaningless. Clearly he is trying to make the point that all of these virtues are tied together and that all arte important, however I think that he makes his case for justice in particular very well. He states “we need justice no matter what virtue we mean to discuss. To speak injudiciously of any virtue is to betray it” (60). Justice is the greatest of all virtues. Without justice other virtues would be somewhat meaningless.
In Comte-Sponville’s chapter on justice, I was most intrigued by his analysis of Hume’s suppositions that try to prove that justice is solely a necessity of society. Hume put forth five hypotheses about five hypothetical situations in which justice would not be necessary, and therefore would not be useful. This struck me as counter-intuitive—aren’t virtues necessary morally regardless of their utilitarian necessity?
ReplyDeleteBut, as C-S grants Hume, the fifth supposition, about a world of complete separation of individuals, is an interesting one. If justice is about treating people equitably, then how could justice be possible in isolation? What bothers me about this argument is, couldn’t we use this thought experiment on all the virtues? How could we be loving or have fidelity in isolation? Aren’t the most important aspects of all the virtues in how they relate to other people? And isn’t this supposition nonsensical anyway? Life is, by nature, social. Someone gives birth to us. We do not spontaneously appear hundreds of miles from anyone. So what’s the point of thinking about a world where everyone is in isolation? To me, this hypothetical seems to lose its value as a point of argument since it simply deletes one of the most important variables involved in the equation. The whole point of virtues and morality is that we are living with other people. So okay, there is no justice in solitude—but I don’t see that that proves anything.
As far as the other four suppositions go, I agree with C-S nearly completely, and share his horror on Hume’s thinking about a world with drastic differences between the strong and the weak. While I know that people have definitely not used justice in such cases many many times in history, I think that this means that in such cases justice is even more necessary, rather than less so.
JJ, my problem with the isolation case is that it assumes that securely having your own property will insure that one is just. But, it fails to take into account the act of using that property. If property is totally secondary to man, than that means that it doesn't warrant the same sort of attention that other humans receive. So, exploiting the land is better than exploiting other people. Laws that favor man over property are just laws, and so on. It's anthro-centric, as all of C-S's discussions are.
ReplyDeleteIs virtue reserved only for humanity?
“Wealth confers no special rights… Genius and saintliness confer no special rights” (69). I love this. What immediately came to mind was Bill Gates. Cool he is a billionaire. Cool he is super smart. So what? That doesn’t make him any more special than us. It doesn’t make his decisions any better than ours.
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From Ellen above...
Isn't the rule of proportionality supposed to come into play here? His actions carry a far greater impact on the world than mine do. So, when he does something bad he has to be held accountable in a different way. The greater the position of a person, the greater the repercussions from abuse. But yeah, he's not better than us - just more successful.
I would bring this issue to the assassination of Osama bin Laden. Was the action of the US Govt., as permitted by the executive branch, just? Did participating in such an action make it more just for such an attempt to be made against our country? By endorsing such an activity, we have changed the discussion for what it means to carry out justice and what rights a nation has to respond to offenses.
And in regards to Homosexuals, the marriage issue is a serious one. But they are not being treated unjustly legally - the law may be favoring one class over another, and the law may be unjust - in the same sense that I'm not being treated unjustly legally. Both male Homosexuals and myself have the right to marry women, and both of us do not have the legal ability to marry men (in most places). The law is treating us both in the same manner.
And if C-S's emphasis on Politics being the combination of might and justice, what of religion? Does marriage, as a religious institution, have a right to be treated fairly. By taking the institution of marriage and making it political, one has removed some of the rights from religion. Is it just to deny them their right to choose which relationships they endorse and don't? Or is marriage through a religious idea outdated and irrelevant to discussion of justice.
I'm all for same-sex civil union and I don't particularly care about the term marriage but recognize the weight it carries with some people. Regardless of the terms, I don't think hetero-couples should get preferential treatment from the government simply for arbitrary reasons.
"Also, people are never really equal. Ever." - julie. Its sad to say that this is entirely true, in the sense that everyone will never be on the same level. However, in a rational (non-idealistic/utopian) world, this makes sense. If you chose to view every interaction that includes a want/need, in order for one person to "win"/gain, someone else has to take a loss. Now, is it just that someone had to lose in order for someone else to gain? It doesn't sound like it is, but can there be a case where it is? Also, on the note of people never being equal, this always has to be true; genetically we are all different and, if Darwin is to be believed, the strong pass on their genes etc (although it can be argued that, in modern society, this does not hold true, because we tend to keep as many people alive as possible, no matter their stength or weakness).
ReplyDelete"is virtue reserved only for humanity?" - leinaDxbx. I feel as if there is a two part answer to such a question. It is reserved to humanity in the sense that we are the only ones who can practice it (obviously the enviroment cannt make choices, let alone good ones... as for animals, its a drives kind of thing, due to a lack of higher thought). However, that doesn't mean that virute and justice aren't going to be applied to the enviroment as well. In fact, it would be more just to treat the earth in a virtuous manner because then it leaves it in a better condition for your fellow man, really bring this back to a social relationship facet.
this was posted by john n. (my google account won't take for some reason)
Justice, Comte-Sponville says, is a good in itself, and also is a virtue that separates good men from tyrants. A tyrant can be brave, generous, polite, faithful, but they can't be just. So justice is a good in itself.
ReplyDeleteI agree that justice is a good thing (obviously), but disagree that a tyrant cannot be just. I would say that some of the worst tyrants are the ones who were most aggressively just. (Being tyrants, most if not all of them perverted justice, but that was the basic idea). The whole idea behind communism, really, is justice--that no one should have more than anyone else. And that is not just Marx's belief--Pascal also said that "inequality of goods" is not just. So communism is based on the idea of absolute justice.
Now, most would agree that theoretical communism hasn't really been tried. Maybe. But then, neither has pure capitalism--in even the most capitalistic societies, there has been plenty of government intervention. The same holds true for all systems of government. But there is, I think, something scary in communism's relentless push towards perfect justice. It ignores (as do most people, I think, who argue that inequality is in itself bad), that while people may be equal under the law and in the eyes of God (if you're into God), they aren't identical, and to treat them as such is a recipe for utter disaster. It also ignores reality--if everyone on earth had precisely the same amount of money, all that would accomplish would be to put everyone in grinding poverty.
Another thing: I found the discussion of justice in an isolated system interesting. It seems clear that justice cannot exist in isolation. but I think any discussion of morality is meaningless in a vacuum. Society is what makes us human, and while I'm not a post-modernist, I think that any system of morality must be viewed through the lens of the surrounding society. I think that is a perfectly isolated system, virtue and vice have no meaning.
I would disagree with Daniel that the communist tyrants were seeking perfect justice. I don't see how the whole idea behind communism is justice. To me, justice is each person gets whatever it is that he or she deserves, be this money, respect, or love. To give an equal amount of a good to people who have done an unequal amount to gain that good is not just. If you want an example of a perfectly just government, read Atlas Shrugged. Dagny Taggart has the right idea about justice.
ReplyDeleteTo me, the whole idea of unconditional love goes against the idea of justice. How can a parent love a child before it has done anything worth loving for. The whole idea of loving somebody not based on merit does not make any sense. I'm sure that when I have children, I will love them. But it won't make sense to me.
Equating justice with the law does not necessarily make sense either. The law changes. The things that Enron did to create their scandal were largely not illegal at the time. However, they were undoubtedly unethical even though they were not outside the bounds of the laws. Also, if justice really is an absolute good, I don't think it can be equated with the law, because an absolute good would not be subject to change.
JJ Ruwe