Sponville states that good faith "consists of love or respect for truth…" (195). He continues by explaining that good faith is not a virtue in the sense that it is automatically righteous, for "good faith is a sincerity…in seeking to establish both among people and within the individual as much truthfulness and authenticity…as possible" (196). However, the killer can be sincere to himself by murdering another person, and that is still good faith to the truth for which he or she established within the self. It is for this reason that Sponville links good faith to "fidelity" or "courage" in that all of them can be applied in positive or negative ways. Sponville's chapter on good faith is filled with qualifiers, just like good faith itself is not entirely a virtue, and I applaud him for that. Too easily nowadays do people seem to be content with themselves in the name of good faith or being true to the self without considering the other virtues.
The first qualifier that Sponville states is that while good faith is not a virtue in of itself, it causes other virtues to meaning. I agree with this statement, for if we cannot trust any truth, then how can we build a society or interact with people. How can the most dominating of virtues, justice, be meaningful without knowing towards what to be just? The same can applied to compassion or even love. If we cannot trust that something is true, then how can we follow it? Even the definition of virtue, which is "excellence" and a "force that has an effect" needs a context to know where to point to or what to strive for (2). What is strived for is the truth, the truth of what we are and what we need to do, and good faith helps us believe in this goal in the first place. In the words of Sponville when compares truth with love, "…love is first in value but second in being" (210).
The second qualifier that Sponville mentions is that good faith is "the refusal to mislead, dissemble, and embellish" (197). Good faith does not command us to "always speak our hearts" (198). Sponville is right in saying that it would take too much time to reveal everything about ourselves, and it violates "decency and gentleness" (198). I would go farther and say that good faith is the foundation that keeps getting molded by the other virtues. One starts with good faith, or the love and trust of the truth, but then the other virtues come into play and limit just how that truth is to be applied and used. Indeed, no virtue should directly conflict another. For example, it would not be prudent to tell one's wife that she looks bad in that dress. It would not be humble to talk about oneself without end. It would not be compassionate to say that one deserved his or her suffering while that person is obviously in pain, even though it is the truth. It would not be temperant to admit that one truthfully loves food as a part of his or her nature, and that is okay, then, to be true to onself and become obese. Rather, good faith just means that we should love the truth and not deceive - that is, openly violate the truth and change the foundation through lying (198).
Sponville also qualifies good faith by saying that even lying is permissible in some situations, if it would satisfy the other virtues. In other words, not only are the virtues limiting good faith and truth, but they are allowed to dominate over it and alter it. As Sponville describes, "If it is necessary to lie in order survive, or in order to hold out against barbarism, or in order to save the life of someone we love, then…we should lie (201-202).
Is it perhaps that modern society has too much good faith? What I mean is that perhaps we forget that the other virtues really command good faith, and that good faith is just the baseline allowing the other virtues and reality itself to make sense? Do we take advantage of this "love of truth" to be simply content with who we are now, instead of striving to become better?
"Good faiths the spirit of the mind, which prefers sincerity to deception, knowledge to illusion, laughter to solemnity" (210).
I think an important point that Comte-Sponville makes is that good faith does not just mean not lying to others, but also it means not lying to ourselves. I think that this makes it much more difficult and important a virtue. I think, personally, it is easier to deceive ourselves than others; however, it is crucial that we refrain from doing so. Good faith is loving the truth more than ourselves which forces us to see both the good and bad. This offers us the chance to better ourselves though because if we are honest with ourselves and can admit our flaws, we can work towards becoming better individuals. Also, I feel that we must first be true to ourselves before we are completely true to others. If we do not know how to be honest with ourselves, how can we always strive to be honest with others, though in my opinion, the latter is often easier to do.
I also appreciated that C-S went into a detailed explanation that good faith does not mean we tell everything that is on our minds all the time. We must use prudence, and sometimes it is best to remain silent rather than tell everything that is in our hearts. Another point that he makes is that sometimes, when other virtues overpower and demand it necessary, lying it okay. For example, he mentions if one was harboring a Jew during the Holocaust, it would be better to lie to the Gestapo about hiding them rather than be honest about it. This is because you are saving the Jew's life which would overpower the lie. Along these lines, I would say that good sense is necessary to use when good faith comes into play in such situations.
In regards to Michael's question about today's society and good faith, I must agree. Although, I'm not sure whether the problem is too much good faith or rather a lack of it? I do think that we are too quick to be content with ourselves rather than truly examine what we need to improve in ourselves in order to become better individuals. I think today's society is quick to think the best of themselves which I would either characterize as bad faith or a lack of TRUE good faith. I think everyone could use more good faith because, like I have previously mentioned, I feel that self-examination is always difficult. Yet, if we are truly people of good faith, that is what we must do. We must identify our faults for what they are rather than try to pass them off as a positive trait or simply act as if they don't exist. While this is easy to do, after all, it is self examination, and no one else may ever discover these faults, it is crucial that we own up. I think the main point I took away from this chapter is that good faith is not self love, but rather loving the truth more than oneself. By adhering to this, we can better ourselves and also become more virtuous individuals in general.
One of the most interesting parts of Comte-Sponville’s chapter about good faith is the idea he brings up about Robinson Crusoe. “Robinson Crusoe’s solitude on his island spared him the obligation of being sincere and even made this virtue pointless. Good faith, however, remained every bit as necessary, praiseworthy, and obligatory. To whom did he owe it? To himself, and that is enough” (196). But is that enough? When Comte-Sponville calls Crusoe’s virtue “pointless,” it certainly makes me wonder about the point of virtue. Is it to create a better world for ourselves and others, as Comte-Sponville seems to intimate here? Or is it to be the best version of ourselves as we can for our own good/self-worth/transcendence? Regardless of the actual purpose of virtue, I still find it an interesting point to think about how we can be virtuous in a solitary situation like Robinson Crusoe found himself in. Which virtues, if we may pick and choose, can be exercised or expressed without the immediate presence of other people? Can we still love the people in the world without ever being able to meet them? Can we still have humility if there’s no one else around us to express our humility to? Can we still have fidelity to our own principles or ideas (for example, the importance/love of freedom) if we have no one to talk about with or no way to act upon them? I suppose the answer lies in what you think it means to have each of the specific virtues.
I think that what Comte-Sponville is saying about good faith is that it absolutely can, because the only subject or intended recipient of this particular virtue, or factor of all other virtues, is ourselves. I don’t think that Comte-Sponville means to say that all virtues are like this. In fact, I think he is setting good faith apart in that it has this self-contained ability. But I think that a debate could be started from what he says about the solitary island experience, discussing the importance of other people in our expression and even ability to possess certain virtues. I know I pretty much veered off the path of just talking about good faith, but I was really intrigued by this particular part of the chapter. Any thoughts?
Kaylan—I will follow you on your path! I love this idea. Can we only have certain virtues when in the midst of others? Are virtues limited to our interactions or can they be practiced in solitary conditions? I, personally, believe that virtues are an expression of the internal. Having good faith, as Comte-Sponville suggests, is honestly expressing our innermost feelings and thoughts. ("As a fact, it consists of the agreement of our acts and words with our inner life of our inner life with itself. (195)) If we have the virtue of good faith, I do not believe that we can act virtuous with others and then fail to practice these virtues when on our own. Despite whether you are with others or not, you can be virtuous in your thoughts. You can be polite in your thoughts toward others. You can have gratitude toward God for what you have been given. Though the virtues cannot be physically expressed without interactions with others, I feel that we can still practice these virtues internally by keeping our thoughts in check.
In the scope of C-S's previously mentioned definition, if we have good faith, we will be completely genuine in all circumstances. Therefore, true virtues can never be a front or an act of showmanship. One can argue, then, that we must first be transformed within before our actions and expressions, no matter how seemingly good, can be considered truly virtuous acts.
Having said this, I believe that being truly virtuous is all about your motives. Do you think that one can be virtuous without corresponding motives? At various points throughout his book, C-S refers to these virtues as stepping stones so that we can act virtuously toward others despite our inability to truly love everyone. Do you, then, believe that these stepping stone virtues are really virtues if they do not match our innermost feelings through good faith?
Once again, Mr. Comte-Sponville has presented the most important virtue: good faith. This time though, he does not praise this virtue consistently throughout the chapter, and ends the chapter by classifying it as “the foremost virtue of intellectuals” and philosophers (pg. 196). His definition of good faith is “[saying] what he believes”, or a type of sincerity (195), and the opposite of narcissism. I agree with this definition of being true to others and to yourself, but it seems very broad. On the one hand, he insists that “virtue devoid of good faith is bad faith and not virtue”(197), then jumps back on his Nazi soapbox by saying “a Nazi who acts in good faith is still a Nazi”(197). On the other hand, he disagrees with Kant's philosophy of no lying and discusses that anyone with good faith will lie. So, good faith is a form of staying faithful to the truth, yet being able to lie when the situation requires it? Dear Mr. C-S... please stay consistent in your philosophy. He does bring up the concept of love acting as a sort of trump card to good faith; if you lie out of love, or to protect someone, it is a form of good faith because you are being true to something you believe. I would love to ask C-S about his thoughts on Christ's greatest commandment of love. His philosophy of love reminds me very much of Christ's concept that love trumps all other commandments. Love trumps all other virtues? Perhaps C-S is more religious than he thinks. The last point I especially liked was that all virtues must be combined and used together otherwise the great ones, like good faith apparently, are useless and not virtuous. It reminds me of cooking. Without the right combination of spices, heat, time, and ingredients, a recipe will not be very good. Virtues are like spices in the human person; they bring out the best in us.
Michael and several others have already discussed what I found the most interesting and what I believe to be the most important thing about Good Faith. I love the explanation of good faith as "the love of faith and the virtue of the truthful". However it is important to note I believe that this virtue is not called honesty or truthfulness. Good Faith is a virtue that considers the exceptions. "Good Faith is not about telling all, it is about speaking only the truth, at least too the best of our belief - unless a higher duty intervenes". It is not virtuous to always be completely truthful and this is finally an explanation of virtue that I so not disagree with and that I think is well explained.
"There is no such thing as absolute sincerity, or absolute love or justice, but this does not prevent us from aspiring to such absolutes, and making the effort to approximate them. Good faith is this effort, which is itself already a virtue". I have spoken in class before about how I believe the extreme situations to be important because they help to make clear what the limits on the virtues are. Should something in which there are exceptions truly be considered a virtue? C-S finally tackles this issue here and I agree with what he is saying. There are no absolute moral virtues. However we must strive for the absolute and that is what makes virtue.
In our last class (October 31st), we spoke quite a bit about whether or not it is possible to love a concept or idea. I still am not caught up on the three definitions of love—so go easy on me—but I feel that Comte-Sponville’s chapter on good faith asserts that we are, at least by his definition, capable of doing so. In fact, on the very first page, he immediately delves into this concept by stating that “As a virtue, [good faith] consists of love or respect for truth, in my opinion, the only faith worth having” (195). I would thus suggest that, if we hold C-S’s interpretation of good faith to be true, the very definition proves that we can and oftentimes need to love ideas in order to be genuinely virtuous.
Once I got past this first definition, however, I was somewhat surprised by the rest of C-S’s portrayal of good faith. I particularly was confused by this statement: “Being of good faith does not mean that one always speaks the truth, since one can make mistakes, but it does mean at the very least that one speaks the truth about what one believes, and this truth, even if what one believes is false, is no less true for that” (196). Correct me if I’m wrong, but what C-S seems to be implying is that it is perfectly virtuous for any blabbermouth to spout off all kinds of ridiculousness, providing that said blabbermouth believes what he says to be true. For this to be allowable, I feel that patience should certainly be one of C-S’s chosen virtues, because it is positively necessary that we employ it when dealing with these types of people (pardon me for being insensitive or for ranting). I dislike this definition of good faith. If we love truth, we should focus our attention on acknowledging our own limits (humility) and on constantly pursuing knowledge.
When people say things that are untrue, but which they completely believe, are they lying? Certainly not. Are they acting in good faith? Apparently so. But my argument is that all people should think before they speak and before they act. C-S says that “Thinking is not just an occupation or an amusement. It is a human requirement and may be the species’ primary virtue” (196-197). I like this statement, but I feel that his definition of good faith contradicts rather than supplements it.
This post might be a bit of an unorganized rant, so feel free to criticize. To close, however, I’d like to state that I’m starting to believe that prudence might be my favorite virtue of all. Comte-Sponville is apt to say that “all virtues stem” from numerous virtues, but I feel that it literally is possible for all to be accomplished through prudence—even good faith. If we take a moment to pause, think about what we are saying, and then decide that we truly believe in what we’d like to share, only then do I think we truly act or speak in good faith.
I found good faith an interesting virtue. It seems to be a perfect example of a virtue where a strict adherence leads to things that can seem wrong. For example, the "tell the truth to a Nazi" scenario we discussed in class. Can there be any situation in which it is permissible to tell the truth in that scenario? Innocent people will die if we do.
But if we look at the scenario logically, it seems we have to tell the truth, always. Take the Nazi scenario. Most people would agree that we can lie there. Take a scenario, though, where a brutal secret police are after a murderer. it's bad guy against bad guy. Are we obligated to lie then? Are we even allowed to? Or what if it's Nazi's against a POSSIBLE murderer? We have no way of knowing whether or not he's innocent or not. Do we tell them where he is? Or say someone we know if innocent is accused of murder. We can only clear him by lying. Should we lie?
So it's not as simple as C-S seems to make it when he says we are "obligated" to lie to Nazis. That only works in the blackest of black and white situations. In gray areas, we have no guidance. And since C-S's philosophy seems to be "it's is always wrong to lie, except when it isn't" we have no way of knowing when it is impermissible not to tell the truth. There is no rule.
That leaves us to two conclusions. One is that virtue is subjective, and we are basically on our own as far as virtue goes. The problem with that is twofold. One is that we run into Dosteovsky's (sp) "If God is dead, then everything is permitted" problem, and two, if virtue is subjective, then there is nothing that says C-S has anything to say on the subject. So for the purposes of this class, let's say that there is a standard of virtue we can maintain. But if that standard is to be consistent, there are times when we must do things that, while moral, have undesirable consequences.
To say otherwise is to force a hybrid of virtue ethics and utilitarianism, which, like most hybrids, doesn't really work. (Ligers are an exception). It isn't logically consistent, and while many of us might decide to lie in certain situations (I would), I don't think it can be morally justified.
I thought that this chapter was an interesting one. It seems to have stirred up several good questions which really got me thinking as I read through the previous comments. While I must admit, prior to reading C-S's work, I didn't really think of good faith as a virtue; to me, it seemed more like a guideline toward virtue, or a modifier on one's behavior. I can now see how "Good Faith" can come off as a virtue since C-S seems to define it as a love of truth (synthesis of love and the truth related virtues).
On the note of perhaps only having virtues in the midst of others (Kaylan & karlie's discussion) I have split beliefs. This seems to be a question similar to "If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?". On the one hand, it logically would follow that, if tree's make sounds when they fall when people are around to hear it, they should still make sounds otherwise, as nothing has changed about their physical make-up. Similarly, if it is good to be virtuous while other people are around, it must still be good to be virtuous in isolation, right? The intrinsic value of being virtuous doesn't change depending on whether or not you've a witness (and for some, it may actually be preferable to be subtly virtuous; “Do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing,” Jesus asserts, “so that your alms may be done in secret” (Mt 6,3-4)). Now, from the other stand point, a tree falling when no one is around to hear it doesn't make sound. In Sociology, we take on the Sociological Imagination (really sociology's CYA to state theories other people probably don't like) we can assume that, because reality is a construct of the collective beliefs/knowledge of humanity and thus, because no one was there to hear it or "imagine it", if you will, it didn't make a sound. The parallel then would be that if no one was around to witness you being virtuous, it simply does not matter, because it might not have happened, as far as society is concerned (assuming that their is no evidence of you works/ you were truly isolated). My inner cynic tells me that if no one is around to witness you being virtuous (and no one will notice that you haven't been later) than it is irrelevant whether or not you've been virtuous due to its implicit nature being a social contract. Everything any decent person/mentor tells us though, is more or less that you should always try to be your best, so I "guess" that will have to suffice.
Good faith is one of those complicated virtues to talk about because everyone has their own opinion of what “good” is and what “faith” is so it gets touchy. So, I’m sure I will end up talking in some controversy.
I think CS starts out with a good definition of good faith. “It is both a psychological fact and moral virtue. As a fact, it consists of the agreement of our acts and words with our inner life, of our inner life with itself. As a virtue, it consists of love or respect for truth, in my opinion, the only faith worth having” (195). To me, this means that when we talk about good faith as a fact of “being good,” it is a combination of the way we act towards our life and the people in it. And the ways we live our lives and the people in it affect ourselves. When CS says that good faith is a virtue, I think that he means that when we act with good faith with and this good faith consists of love for others and respect for truth in our lives then we are acting in good faith in a virtuous manner.
“Good faith is a sincerity that is both transitive and reflexive” (196). This, my fellow virtue bloggers, is math. In math, reflexive means that when you put something in, you get the same thing out. So, whatever your x component is, your y component is also going to be. Think of the line y=x. Transitive means that if A goes to B, and B goes to C then A goes to C. So in terms of sincerity, reflexive means that sincerity when given, is received. So when you are sincere to someone they are sincere back. And in terms of sincerity transitivity means that when you are sincere to someone, and they are sincere to someone else, you are being sincere to a third part person. In other words, If Abby shows sincerity to Bobby and Bobby shows sincerity to Cortney, and then by connections Abby is showing sincerity to Cortney. So math. Yay! Therefore when BOTH happen, there is good faith happening. While CS does not explicitly agree with me, he says something along the same terms as my explanation, though his was much shorter.
“As its most general, good faith is nothing other than love of truth” (209). I do not completely agree. I believe you can have good faith in things without loving the truth of that thing. You can have good faith that a friend will get good grades without loving the truth of that actually happening or not.
I don't think that we are always obligated to practice good faith. In the Nazi situation, I would not hesitate to lie to the SS. However, I may not be the best example, because I think that lying is permissible in a lot of situations. Granted, honesty is usually the best policy, but if a situation arises where somebody is overstepping the bounds of curiosity and is ranging into the territory of nosiness, a lie is often necessary and alright to do. The way that I view it is if somebody does not have a right ask about something, but ask anyway, then they don't have a right to a truthful answer, and I can lie about it. I don't think the SS has a right to know where the Jews are, so I'm not going to tell them where my secret room is. As my illustrious brother points out, that is a very black and white case, but I don't think that it is very difficult for a reasonable person to judge when good faith is or is not an obligatory virtue. On the note of virtues being applicable when in solitude, I think that a lot of them are. However, many of them seem to be limited to practicing on others. As a hermit in the dessert, I would find it hard to practice charity or tolerance. However, humility, good faith, prudence, and temperance are all virtues that are useful even in solitude. JJ Ruwe
Sponville states that good faith "consists of love or respect for truth…" (195). He continues by explaining that good faith is not a virtue in the sense that it is automatically righteous, for "good faith is a sincerity…in seeking to establish both among people and within the individual as much truthfulness and authenticity…as possible" (196). However, the killer can be sincere to himself by murdering another person, and that is still good faith to the truth for which he or she established within the self. It is for this reason that Sponville links good faith to "fidelity" or "courage" in that all of them can be applied in positive or negative ways. Sponville's chapter on good faith is filled with qualifiers, just like good faith itself is not entirely a virtue, and I applaud him for that. Too easily nowadays do people seem to be content with themselves in the name of good faith or being true to the self without considering the other virtues.
ReplyDeleteThe first qualifier that Sponville states is that while good faith is not a virtue in of itself, it causes other virtues to meaning. I agree with this statement, for if we cannot trust any truth, then how can we build a society or interact with people. How can the most dominating of virtues, justice, be meaningful without knowing towards what to be just? The same can applied to compassion or even love. If we cannot trust that something is true, then how can we follow it? Even the definition of virtue, which is "excellence" and a "force that has an effect" needs a context to know where to point to or what to strive for (2). What is strived for is the truth, the truth of what we are and what we need to do, and good faith helps us believe in this goal in the first place. In the words of Sponville when compares truth with love, "…love is first in value but second in being" (210).
The second qualifier that Sponville mentions is that good faith is "the refusal to mislead, dissemble, and embellish" (197). Good faith does not command us to "always speak our hearts" (198). Sponville is right in saying that it would take too much time to reveal everything about ourselves, and it violates "decency and gentleness" (198). I would go farther and say that good faith is the foundation that keeps getting molded by the other virtues. One starts with good faith, or the love and trust of the truth, but then the other virtues come into play and limit just how that truth is to be applied and used. Indeed, no virtue should directly conflict another. For example, it would not be prudent to tell one's wife that she looks bad in that dress. It would not be humble to talk about oneself without end. It would not be compassionate to say that one deserved his or her suffering while that person is obviously in pain, even though it is the truth. It would not be temperant to admit that one truthfully loves food as a part of his or her nature, and that is okay, then, to be true to onself and become obese. Rather, good faith just means that we should love the truth and not deceive - that is, openly violate the truth and change the foundation through lying (198).
Sponville also qualifies good faith by saying that even lying is permissible in some situations, if it would satisfy the other virtues. In other words, not only are the virtues limiting good faith and truth, but they are allowed to dominate over it and alter it. As Sponville describes, "If it is necessary to lie in order survive, or in order to hold out against barbarism, or in order to save the life of someone we love, then…we should lie (201-202).
ReplyDeleteIs it perhaps that modern society has too much good faith? What I mean is that perhaps we forget that the other virtues really command good faith, and that good faith is just the baseline allowing the other virtues and reality itself to make sense? Do we take advantage of this "love of truth" to be simply content with who we are now, instead of striving to become better?
"Good faiths the spirit of the mind, which prefers sincerity to deception, knowledge to illusion, laughter to solemnity" (210).
ReplyDeleteI think an important point that Comte-Sponville makes is that good faith does not just mean not lying to others, but also it means not lying to ourselves. I think that this makes it much more difficult and important a virtue. I think, personally, it is easier to deceive ourselves than others; however, it is crucial that we refrain from doing so. Good faith is loving the truth more than ourselves which forces us to see both the good and bad. This offers us the chance to better ourselves though because if we are honest with ourselves and can admit our flaws, we can work towards becoming better individuals. Also, I feel that we must first be true to ourselves before we are completely true to others. If we do not know how to be honest with ourselves, how can we always strive to be honest with others, though in my opinion, the latter is often easier to do.
I also appreciated that C-S went into a detailed explanation that good faith does not mean we tell everything that is on our minds all the time. We must use prudence, and sometimes it is best to remain silent rather than tell everything that is in our hearts. Another point that he makes is that sometimes, when other virtues overpower and demand it necessary, lying it okay. For example, he mentions if one was harboring a Jew during the Holocaust, it would be better to lie to the Gestapo about hiding them rather than be honest about it. This is because you are saving the Jew's life which would overpower the lie. Along these lines, I would say that good sense is necessary to use when good faith comes into play in such situations.
In regards to Michael's question about today's society and good faith, I must agree. Although, I'm not sure whether the problem is too much good faith or rather a lack of it? I do think that we are too quick to be content with ourselves rather than truly examine what we need to improve in ourselves in order to become better individuals. I think today's society is quick to think the best of themselves which I would either characterize as bad faith or a lack of TRUE good faith. I think everyone could use more good faith because, like I have previously mentioned, I feel that self-examination is always difficult. Yet, if we are truly people of good faith, that is what we must do. We must identify our faults for what they are rather than try to pass them off as a positive trait or simply act as if they don't exist. While this is easy to do, after all, it is self examination, and no one else may ever discover these faults, it is crucial that we own up. I think the main point I took away from this chapter is that good faith is not self love, but rather loving the truth more than oneself. By adhering to this, we can better ourselves and also become more virtuous individuals in general.
One of the most interesting parts of Comte-Sponville’s chapter about good faith is the idea he brings up about Robinson Crusoe. “Robinson Crusoe’s solitude on his island spared him the obligation of being sincere and even made this virtue pointless. Good faith, however, remained every bit as necessary, praiseworthy, and obligatory. To whom did he owe it? To himself, and that is enough” (196). But is that enough? When Comte-Sponville calls Crusoe’s virtue “pointless,” it certainly makes me wonder about the point of virtue. Is it to create a better world for ourselves and others, as Comte-Sponville seems to intimate here? Or is it to be the best version of ourselves as we can for our own good/self-worth/transcendence? Regardless of the actual purpose of virtue, I still find it an interesting point to think about how we can be virtuous in a solitary situation like Robinson Crusoe found himself in. Which virtues, if we may pick and choose, can be exercised or expressed without the immediate presence of other people? Can we still love the people in the world without ever being able to meet them? Can we still have humility if there’s no one else around us to express our humility to? Can we still have fidelity to our own principles or ideas (for example, the importance/love of freedom) if we have no one to talk about with or no way to act upon them? I suppose the answer lies in what you think it means to have each of the specific virtues.
ReplyDeleteI think that what Comte-Sponville is saying about good faith is that it absolutely can, because the only subject or intended recipient of this particular virtue, or factor of all other virtues, is ourselves. I don’t think that Comte-Sponville means to say that all virtues are like this. In fact, I think he is setting good faith apart in that it has this self-contained ability. But I think that a debate could be started from what he says about the solitary island experience, discussing the importance of other people in our expression and even ability to possess certain virtues. I know I pretty much veered off the path of just talking about good faith, but I was really intrigued by this particular part of the chapter. Any thoughts?
Kaylan—I will follow you on your path! I love this idea. Can we only have certain virtues when in the midst of others? Are virtues limited to our interactions or can they be practiced in solitary conditions? I, personally, believe that virtues are an expression of the internal. Having good faith, as Comte-Sponville suggests, is honestly expressing our innermost feelings and thoughts. ("As a fact, it consists of the agreement of our acts and words with our inner life of our inner life with itself. (195)) If we have the virtue of good faith, I do not believe that we can act virtuous with others and then fail to practice these virtues when on our own. Despite whether you are with others or not, you can be virtuous in your thoughts. You can be polite in your thoughts toward others. You can have gratitude toward God for what you have been given. Though the virtues cannot be physically expressed without interactions with others, I feel that we can still practice these virtues internally by keeping our thoughts in check.
ReplyDeleteIn the scope of C-S's previously mentioned definition, if we have good faith, we will be completely genuine in all circumstances. Therefore, true virtues can never be a front or an act of showmanship. One can argue, then, that we must first be transformed within before our actions and expressions, no matter how seemingly good, can be considered truly virtuous acts.
Having said this, I believe that being truly virtuous is all about your motives. Do you think that one can be virtuous without corresponding motives? At various points throughout his book, C-S refers to these virtues as stepping stones so that we can act virtuously toward others despite our inability to truly love everyone. Do you, then, believe that these stepping stone virtues are really virtues if they do not match our innermost feelings through good faith?
ReplyDeleteOnce again, Mr. Comte-Sponville has presented the most important virtue: good faith. This time though, he does not praise this virtue consistently throughout the chapter, and ends the chapter by classifying it as “the foremost virtue of intellectuals” and philosophers (pg. 196). His definition of good faith is “[saying] what he believes”, or a type of sincerity (195), and the opposite of narcissism. I agree with this definition of being true to others and to yourself, but it seems very broad. On the one hand, he insists that “virtue devoid of good faith is bad faith and not virtue”(197), then jumps back on his Nazi soapbox by saying “a Nazi who acts in good faith is still a Nazi”(197). On the other hand, he disagrees with Kant's philosophy of no lying and discusses that anyone with good faith will lie. So, good faith is a form of staying faithful to the truth, yet being able to lie when the situation requires it? Dear Mr. C-S... please stay consistent in your philosophy.
ReplyDeleteHe does bring up the concept of love acting as a sort of trump card to good faith; if you lie out of love, or to protect someone, it is a form of good faith because you are being true to something you believe. I would love to ask C-S about his thoughts on Christ's greatest commandment of love. His philosophy of love reminds me very much of Christ's concept that love trumps all other commandments. Love trumps all other virtues? Perhaps C-S is more religious than he thinks.
The last point I especially liked was that all virtues must be combined and used together otherwise the great ones, like good faith apparently, are useless and not virtuous. It reminds me of cooking. Without the right combination of spices, heat, time, and ingredients, a recipe will not be very good. Virtues are like spices in the human person; they bring out the best in us.
Michael and several others have already discussed what I found the most interesting and what I believe to be the most important thing about Good Faith. I love the explanation of good faith as "the love of faith and the virtue of the truthful". However it is important to note I believe that this virtue is not called honesty or truthfulness. Good Faith is a virtue that considers the exceptions. "Good Faith is not about telling all, it is about speaking only the truth, at least too the best of our belief - unless a higher duty intervenes". It is not virtuous to always be completely truthful and this is finally an explanation of virtue that I so not disagree with and that I think is well explained.
ReplyDelete"There is no such thing as absolute sincerity, or absolute love or justice, but this does not prevent us from aspiring to such absolutes, and making the effort to approximate them. Good faith is this effort, which is itself already a virtue". I have spoken in class before about how I believe the extreme situations to be important because they help to make clear what the limits on the virtues are. Should something in which there are exceptions truly be considered a virtue? C-S finally tackles this issue here and I agree with what he is saying. There are no absolute moral virtues. However we must strive for the absolute and that is what makes virtue.
In our last class (October 31st), we spoke quite a bit about whether or not it is possible to love a concept or idea. I still am not caught up on the three definitions of love—so go easy on me—but I feel that Comte-Sponville’s chapter on good faith asserts that we are, at least by his definition, capable of doing so. In fact, on the very first page, he immediately delves into this concept by stating that “As a virtue, [good faith] consists of love or respect for truth, in my opinion, the only faith worth having” (195). I would thus suggest that, if we hold C-S’s interpretation of good faith to be true, the very definition proves that we can and oftentimes need to love ideas in order to be genuinely virtuous.
ReplyDeleteOnce I got past this first definition, however, I was somewhat surprised by the rest of C-S’s portrayal of good faith. I particularly was confused by this statement: “Being of good faith does not mean that one always speaks the truth, since one can make mistakes, but it does mean at the very least that one speaks the truth about what one believes, and this truth, even if what one believes is false, is no less true for that” (196). Correct me if I’m wrong, but what C-S seems to be implying is that it is perfectly virtuous for any blabbermouth to spout off all kinds of ridiculousness, providing that said blabbermouth believes what he says to be true. For this to be allowable, I feel that patience should certainly be one of C-S’s chosen virtues, because it is positively necessary that we employ it when dealing with these types of people (pardon me for being insensitive or for ranting). I dislike this definition of good faith. If we love truth, we should focus our attention on acknowledging our own limits (humility) and on constantly pursuing knowledge.
When people say things that are untrue, but which they completely believe, are they lying? Certainly not. Are they acting in good faith? Apparently so. But my argument is that all people should think before they speak and before they act. C-S says that “Thinking is not just an occupation or an amusement. It is a human requirement and may be the species’ primary virtue” (196-197). I like this statement, but I feel that his definition of good faith contradicts rather than supplements it.
This post might be a bit of an unorganized rant, so feel free to criticize. To close, however, I’d like to state that I’m starting to believe that prudence might be my favorite virtue of all. Comte-Sponville is apt to say that “all virtues stem” from numerous virtues, but I feel that it literally is possible for all to be accomplished through prudence—even good faith. If we take a moment to pause, think about what we are saying, and then decide that we truly believe in what we’d like to share, only then do I think we truly act or speak in good faith.
I found good faith an interesting virtue. It seems to be a perfect example of a virtue where a strict adherence leads to things that can seem wrong. For example, the "tell the truth to a Nazi" scenario we discussed in class. Can there be any situation in which it is permissible to tell the truth in that scenario? Innocent people will die if we do.
ReplyDeleteBut if we look at the scenario logically, it seems we have to tell the truth, always. Take the Nazi scenario. Most people would agree that we can lie there. Take a scenario, though, where a brutal secret police are after a murderer. it's bad guy against bad guy. Are we obligated to lie then? Are we even allowed to? Or what if it's Nazi's against a POSSIBLE murderer? We have no way of knowing whether or not he's innocent or not. Do we tell them where he is? Or say someone we know if innocent is accused of murder. We can only clear him by lying. Should we lie?
So it's not as simple as C-S seems to make it when he says we are "obligated" to lie to Nazis. That only works in the blackest of black and white situations. In gray areas, we have no guidance. And since C-S's philosophy seems to be "it's is always wrong to lie, except when it isn't" we have no way of knowing when it is impermissible not to tell the truth. There is no rule.
That leaves us to two conclusions. One is that virtue is subjective, and we are basically on our own as far as virtue goes. The problem with that is twofold. One is that we run into Dosteovsky's (sp) "If God is dead, then everything is permitted" problem, and two, if virtue is subjective, then there is nothing that says C-S has anything to say on the subject. So for the purposes of this class, let's say that there is a standard of virtue we can maintain. But if that standard is to be consistent, there are times when we must do things that, while moral, have undesirable consequences.
To say otherwise is to force a hybrid of virtue ethics and utilitarianism, which, like most hybrids, doesn't really work. (Ligers are an exception). It isn't logically consistent, and while many of us might decide to lie in certain situations (I would), I don't think it can be morally justified.
I thought that this chapter was an interesting one. It seems to have stirred up several good questions which really got me thinking as I read through the previous comments. While I must admit, prior to reading C-S's work, I didn't really think of good faith as a virtue; to me, it seemed more like a guideline toward virtue, or a modifier on one's behavior. I can now see how "Good Faith" can come off as a virtue since C-S seems to define it as a love of truth (synthesis of love and the truth related virtues).
ReplyDeleteOn the note of perhaps only having virtues in the midst of others (Kaylan & karlie's discussion) I have split beliefs. This seems to be a question similar to "If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?". On the one hand, it logically would follow that, if tree's make sounds when they fall when people are around to hear it, they should still make sounds otherwise, as nothing has changed about their physical make-up. Similarly, if it is good to be virtuous while other people are around, it must still be good to be virtuous in isolation, right? The intrinsic value of being virtuous doesn't change depending on whether or not you've a witness (and for some, it may actually be preferable to be subtly virtuous; “Do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing,” Jesus asserts, “so that your alms may be done in secret” (Mt 6,3-4)). Now, from the other stand point, a tree falling when no one is around to hear it doesn't make sound. In Sociology, we take on the Sociological Imagination (really sociology's CYA to state theories other people probably don't like) we can assume that, because reality is a construct of the collective beliefs/knowledge of humanity and thus, because no one was there to hear it or "imagine it", if you will, it didn't make a sound. The parallel then would be that if no one was around to witness you being virtuous, it simply does not matter, because it might not have happened, as far as society is concerned (assuming that their is no evidence of you works/ you were truly isolated). My inner cynic tells me that if no one is around to witness you being virtuous (and no one will notice that you haven't been later) than it is irrelevant whether or not you've been virtuous due to its implicit nature being a social contract. Everything any decent person/mentor tells us though, is more or less that you should always try to be your best, so I "guess" that will have to suffice.
Good faith is one of those complicated virtues to talk about because everyone has their own opinion of what “good” is and what “faith” is so it gets touchy. So, I’m sure I will end up talking in some controversy.
ReplyDeleteI think CS starts out with a good definition of good faith. “It is both a psychological fact and moral virtue. As a fact, it consists of the agreement of our acts and words with our inner life, of our inner life with itself. As a virtue, it consists of love or respect for truth, in my opinion, the only faith worth having” (195). To me, this means that when we talk about good faith as a fact of “being good,” it is a combination of the way we act towards our life and the people in it. And the ways we live our lives and the people in it affect ourselves. When CS says that good faith is a virtue, I think that he means that when we act with good faith with and this good faith consists of love for others and respect for truth in our lives then we are acting in good faith in a virtuous manner.
“Good faith is a sincerity that is both transitive and reflexive” (196). This, my fellow virtue bloggers, is math. In math, reflexive means that when you put something in, you get the same thing out. So, whatever your x component is, your y component is also going to be. Think of the line y=x. Transitive means that if A goes to B, and B goes to C then A goes to C. So in terms of sincerity, reflexive means that sincerity when given, is received. So when you are sincere to someone they are sincere back. And in terms of sincerity transitivity means that when you are sincere to someone, and they are sincere to someone else, you are being sincere to a third part person. In other words, If Abby shows sincerity to Bobby and Bobby shows sincerity to Cortney, and then by connections Abby is showing sincerity to Cortney. So math. Yay! Therefore when BOTH happen, there is good faith happening. While CS does not explicitly agree with me, he says something along the same terms as my explanation, though his was much shorter.
“As its most general, good faith is nothing other than love of truth” (209). I do not completely agree. I believe you can have good faith in things without loving the truth of that thing. You can have good faith that a friend will get good grades without loving the truth of that actually happening or not.
So, not too much controversy.
I don't think that we are always obligated to practice good faith. In the Nazi situation, I would not hesitate to lie to the SS. However, I may not be the best example, because I think that lying is permissible in a lot of situations. Granted, honesty is usually the best policy, but if a situation arises where somebody is overstepping the bounds of curiosity and is ranging into the territory of nosiness, a lie is often necessary and alright to do. The way that I view it is if somebody does not have a right ask about something, but ask anyway, then they don't have a right to a truthful answer, and I can lie about it. I don't think the SS has a right to know where the Jews are, so I'm not going to tell them where my secret room is. As my illustrious brother points out, that is a very black and white case, but I don't think that it is very difficult for a reasonable person to judge when good faith is or is not an obligatory virtue.
ReplyDeleteOn the note of virtues being applicable when in solitude, I think that a lot of them are. However, many of them seem to be limited to practicing on others. As a hermit in the dessert, I would find it hard to practice charity or tolerance. However, humility, good faith, prudence, and temperance are all virtues that are useful even in solitude.
JJ Ruwe